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ABSTRACT:
Market forces such as the national recession, changing customer needs, and increasing
competition, have forced many companies throughout the United States to redesign their
corporate strategies. A restructuring of business strategy often necessitates fundamental
structural change within the organization.
One type of fundamental change process is called Business Process Reengineering (BPR).
This thesis will focus on BPR by providing a literature review that will identify its
different aspects and characteristics. The literature review provides various definitions of
BPR, shows its evolution, and provides guidelines to its application by identifying
common implementational steps. A matrix is presented at the end of the literature review
which summarizes the salient aspects of BPR.
Due to the recent upheavals in the national real estate market, there are many real estate
related companies that have considered fundamental strategic change. The thesis
includes a case study on a company that has undergone a reengineering process. The case
provides an example of the practical application of BPR.
After the case, a comparative analysis is made between the matrix derived from the
literature review and the case study. The thesis concludes with general items that are
applicable to of BPR:
" Empowerment and Information Technology may be products of BPR.
" Detailed vision is critical to the reengineering process.
* BPR is a long term process which involves substantial commitment.
Thesis Supervisor: Gloria Schuck
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1980's, the national commercial real estate market experienced an
unparalleled frenzy of new development. This activity resulted from a combination of
unique historical factors. Banks, Savings and Loans and other lending institutions
established relatively lax lending practices. In addition, the US government provided
extremely favorable tax breaks for investments in real estate. By the early 1990's, the
combination of these factors resulted in a national real estate market while facing the
largest imbalance between supply and demand in its history.
These environmental factors created a mandate for change in real estate related
companies. Many successful real estate companies who could do no wrong in the 1980's
were forced to adapt to a fundamentally different real estate climate in the early 1990's.
Some of the companies ceased to exist, while others implemented a continuous stream of
"quick fix" programs in a desperate effort to get ahead of their problems. A few select
real estate companies that had a long term perspective, saw a need to fundamentally
change their business strategy and operations in order to survive.
In addition to real estate companies, many other types of companies have needed to make
fundamental business changes. The national recession, increased competition and higher
consumer expectations combined to create overwhelming environmental forces requiring
organizational change. To operate in a new environment, organizations had to change
their strategy. As a result of the change in strategy, the organizational structure was
changed to properly support the new strategy. One approach to accomplish such sweeping
change is the process commonly know as "reengineering". The following diagram
illustrates the typical steps leading to a reengineering change process.
Environmental Change -+Strategic Change -+ Reengineering Process
"Reengineering" has become a trendy topic and a buzzword in many business journals.
In various publications there have been articles expousing reengineering as a panacea to
modern day business problems. Due to this popularity, reengineering has often been a
mislabeled and over-franchised term which has lead to many nebulous ideas as to its
exact significance.
At its worst, reengineering may just be hype or the latest fad in a long line of management
improvement programs. At its best, reengineering may be change that can have a positive
and long-lasting affect on an organization's operation and performance. The thesis
explores the elements of reengineering and examines their empirical applications. Using a
detailed literature review and a case study, this thesis closely looks at the elements of
reengineering in theory and in practice to better understand the process.
Since the real estate market crash created the impetus for some real estate companies to
make fundamental organizational changes, understanding the process of reengineering
and how it applies to the "real world" is critical for today's companies. The focus of the
thesis is to aid in the understanding of the reengineering process. To learn more about the
practical qualities and applications of the reengineering process, this thesis includes a
case study on a company which has recently undergone fundamental organizational
change. Since the plummeting real estate market has created a sense of urgency for
change in many real estate companies, a case study in the real estate industry is a natural
fit for the study of reengineering.
The Massachusetts-based Copley Real Estate Advisors ("Copley") is the subject of the
case study. Copley's change process was initiated in late 1993; the study provides current
insight to reengineering and the issues involving its implementation.
Thesis Structure
Chapter One provides background on the national real estate industry and establishes the
environmental context for the case study. It describes why there is a mandate for
fundamental organizational change in the real estate industry by presenting the various
factors leading to the rise and fall of the national real estate market during the 1980's and
early 1990's.
Chapter Two discusses the elements of reengineering theory: including its definition and
implementation guidelines. The literature review defines key reengineering terms and
principles, examines successful strategies for implementation and presents the potential
outcomes of reengineering. This chapter also discusses the role of two important aspects
of the reengineering process, empowerment and information technology, and the role they
play in the reengineering process The chapter will conclude with a matrix featuring the
key elements of reengineering as outlined by the literature review.
Chapter Three is the case study on Copley Real Estate Advisors detailing an example of
the reengineering change process.
Chapter Four provides an analysis of the Copley case study discussing the similarities
and differences between the Copley change process and the components of reengineering
covered in Chapter Two. As a tool for analysis, the case will be applied to the matrix
found at the end of Chapter Two..
Chapter Five ends the thesis by presenting general conclusions drawn from the literature
review, case study and analysis.
CHAPTER ONE
Setting the Stage: The Real Estate Market in the 1980's and Early 1990's
In a Nutshell
Throughout most of the 1980's, tremendous growth in the US economy created strong
demand for both commercial and residential property. New development far exceeded
the level of demand, which lead to increased vacancy rates and lower rents. In the
1980's, however, values for commercial property were steadily rising despite these
negative factors. With increasing asset values, developers continued to build until the
market finally collapsed. During this development boom, property values were steadily
increasing despite a serious oversupply of product. The explanation of how this
happened, helps to understand the recent real estate crisis.
Although each local real estate market had its own particularities, there were two factors
which created a widespread oversupply of commercial product:
1. Changes in tax law;
2. Excessive liquidity.
Changes in Tax Law
The first factor, created during Reagan administration, was the generous tax write-offs for
real estate investment. In 1981, tax legislation changed allowing investors to accelerate
depreciation of real estate assets. Because of these accelerated write offs, investor's
demand to hold real estate skyrocketed. At the same time, returns required by the
investors were significantly lowered by taking into consideration the after tax benefits.
This often created situations in which buildings with negative or near negative net
operating income were being constructed or purchased simply for the tax benefits.
Investors were buying real estate on the merits of "tax flow" and not "cash flow".
As a result of rising values from increased investor demand, construction spending took
off for every product type from office to residential. In the office sector alone,
construction spending reached an annual level of $34 billion by 1985. This represented a
100% increase from a comparable level in 1979, before the impact of the changes in tax
law. (Kelso and Mara, 1992, p. 6).
With a seemingly endless rise in real estate values, both foreign and domestic investors
flooded the market searching for real estate investments. To fill the demand, real estate
syndicators rapidly created investment partnerships offering tremendous after tax returns.
Some of these syndications boasted phenomenal annual returns as high as 150%. In spite
of the tremendous amount of product constructed, insatiable investor demand continue to
propel real estate values higher and higher.
Excessive Liquidity
The other contributing factor was the favorable borrowing climate for real estate product.
With increasing asset values, institutional lenders rushed into the real estate arena. The
relatively lax lending standards during the 1980's, coupled with falling interest rates,
enabled developers to obtain easy construction/permanent financing. The major reasons
for the lax lending criteria were:
1. Ineffective Checks and Balances. Although most lending institutions established an
appropriate systems of checks and balances for corporate lending, these systems were
poorly maintained or watered down for real estate lending. Often the institution's senior
management deferred critical lending decisions solely to the judgment of the loan
officers. As one commercial real estate banker observed, "Senior management was
willing to believe that we had things under control ... and we were certainly willing to tell
them everything was O.K.!" (Kelso and Mara, 1992, p.6)
2. Improper Accounting for True Economics and Risks. During the 1980's, the
accounting treatment and management reporting for many real estate lending divisions
often overstated profitability and understated risks. Origination fees for real estate loans
were often treated as income in the year received rather than conservatively amortized
over the life of the loan. This practice gave lenders incentive to increase the volume of
commercial loans. However, this practice created a misleading and often incorrect
impression of an institution's potential for long-term profitability.
3. Growth and Current Profitability Rewards. Within lending institutions, real estate
department heads were often generously rewarded for the level of profitability within
their division. Rewards included bonuses for exceeding budgeted targets in asset growth
and profit contribution. Such a system of incentives encouraged decision makers to
increase loan portfolios and current profitability to the exclusion of weighing other
factors such as risk. Also, competition between institutions for experienced real estate
lenders resulted in the institutions giving them more autonomy in lending decisions.
4. Risk Acceptance Criteria Loosened. Many institutions either loosened or consistently
overrode their risk acceptance criteria. Loans often amounted to 100%-110% of the
property's projected completion value, rather than as a percentage of the project
construction costs. To increase lending, many lenders offered 3-5 five year loans,
commonly referred to as "mini-perms", without the requirement of a future commitment
from a permanent lender.
5. Early Warning Indicators Missed. Even though vacancies increased and rents
declined, lenders ignored these signs of an over built market and continued to lend on the
basis of projected value.
The Turning of the Screw
The picture changed by the second half of the 1980's. Interest rates were no longer
declining and, more significantly, many of the favorable tax benefits associated with real
estate investment disappeared with the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. This
legislation shifted the focus in real estate investment back to a cash flow perspective from
the previous tax benefit perspective. With the elimination of special incentives for real
estate, the artificial pricing mechanism supporting property values collapsed and was
replaced with traditional measurements of value such as net operating income and pre-tax
return.
With a glut of commercial real estate inventory and waning demand resulting from the
US economic recession, there was a chasm between supply and demand in the late
1980's. Tax reform fell on an already over built market, removing the incentive to borrow
and build whether or not anyone ever occupied the space. As one office developer
observed:
"I used to think I knew a lot about the real-estate business. I think we
were all naive. We all overestimated the strength of the economy to
support all of this real estate. I just didn't realize how much of it was tax-
incentive driven. I knew the 1986 tax act would slow down the industry, I
didn't realize it would obliterate it."
(Mahar, 1991, p. 24)
With the combined effects of the elimination of the tax incentives for real estate, the
national recession and declining vacancies, many real estate owners were unable to
service the debt on their projects and were forced to turn them back to the lenders. To
avoid the negative impact on the their financial statement, many lenders "worked out"
defaulted loans and reissued new terms for the loans in the attempt to avoid foreclosure
on rapidly depreciating property. Despite these efforts, lenders ultimately held huge
portfolios of property from non-performing loans.
The insolvency of many banks and S&Ls because of their bad real estate loan portfolios
resulted in a government-assisted liquidation of the portfolios through the Federally
created Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). The RTC property liquidation program had
the effect of dumping huge amounts of property which were bought at prices that were
often a fraction of replacement cost. Because the properties were often sold in bulk at
enormous discounts, the purchasers were able to slash the rents for the properties, in order
to lease more quickly, and still have a positive cash flow. This caused a flood of
inexpensive commercial property to many markets which were already oversupplied.
This caused a further decrease in commercial rents in many markets and forced many
property owners who were able to hold on to their properties during the first decline to
finally give in.
According to a 1991 report by the Federal Reserve, only one-third of the construction
loans due in 1990 were retired in accordance with the original terms. In 1990,
foreclosures at Chemical Bank increased by 45% over the previous year and problem and
foreclosed loans comprised 58% of the bank's net worth. (Mahar, 1991, p. 21). Instead of
an exception to the rule, Chemical Bank's position mirrored the predicament of most
major lenders in the country.
Maggie Mahar, in an article from Barron's, summarized the problem with lending
institutions in the 1980's:
"Developer's didn't borrow in order to build; all too often they built in
order to borrow-and borrow some more. The abundance of available
capital, combined with S&L deregulation and inflation (in asset value) ...
conspired to make it worthwhile for an entrepreneur to break ground and
throw up a skyscraper just about anywhere."
(Mahar, 1991, p.24)
The resulting oversupply is illustrated by the dramatic increase in office vacancy rates
which quadrupled from 5% in 1980 to 20% in 1990. Rents during the same period nearly
halved from a national peak of $30 per square foot in 1982 to around $18 per square foot
in 1990. (Mahar, 1991, pp. 10-11).
David Schulman, a real estate analyst for Salomon Brothers, noted:
"In the 'Eighties', with the onslaught of construction, vacancies rose - they
were up to 20% by '86 or '87. Yet people continued building because
there was still demand to lend on the assets. It was a frenzy. The link
between vacancy rates and capital markets disappeared."
(Mahar,1992, p.24)
Julien Studley, founder of the national real estate company bearing his name, observed:
"You know how buildings used to be built - before the 'Eighties?' You got
a site. You got tenants. Then, you got financing. But in the craziness of the
'Eighties', sometimes the process reversed. Sometimes you got financing
just on the dream of a site. A lender would say, 'You've got the financing.
If you just get the site, we'll give you the money.' And then, some third
party - maybe an insurance company or pension fund - would say, 'You
know when you get that building built, I'll buy it from you for a 5% return
and lease it to financially shaky tenants who will have to relocate before
the five year lease is up. They leave in two years, and we'll get even higher
rents from someone else.' "
(Mahar, 1992, p.24)
In the aftermath, the tenants in fact left the space, but unfortunately, there was no one that
would lease at higher rents. In many cases, landlords were fortunate to find tenants who
would lease the space at all. Says Schulman:
As a result of the tremendous oversupply of commercial real estate from
the 1980's, real estate in the early nineties is hitting the bottom with a thud
instead of a bounce. The V-shaped curve of real-estate recession and
recovery has become an L. Texas where the market fell first, illustrates the
pattern: When available space began to decline, prices failed to rebound.
Even when prices adjusted for smaller concessions in the form of free
rents and tenant improvements, real rent remained relatively flat. Or as one
Houston broker puts it: "We turned the corner but we didn't leave any skid
marks."
(Mahar, 1992, p. 24)
Game Plan
This description of the real estate rise and fall in the 1980's illustrates the desperate
situation of many real estate owners, developers, and lenders at the point of the market
crash in the late 1980's. During the crash, many real estate related companies and
financial institutions went bankrupt. Almost all were faced with a situation which
necessitated business changes. Some companies saw that fundamental changes were
necessary to survive, and applied the process of reengineering as a solution.
The following chapter provides a detailed literature review on the subject of
reengineering. The definitions, implementation process, and outcomes of reengineering
are presented. In addition, two primary ingredients of the reengineering process,
empowerment and information technology, are also presented. Both have often been
hailed as the corner stones of the reengineering process.
At the close of the literature review, a matrix is presented which outlines the major
definitional and implementational components of reengineering. This same matrix is
used to analyze the case study. Each component of the Copley change process will be
examined in relation to the matrix. This will compare the case study to various
components of reengineering theory found in the following chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING
INTRODUCTION
"Reengineering" has become a very popular subject. From trade journals to cocktail party
conversation, the subject of reengineering is discussed. Despite its popularity, the process
of reengineering is a concept that is often misunderstood. Many view reengineering as
simply fixing a problem, others associate reengineering with corporate cutbacks and
personnel layoffs. Although many conceptions give a partial understanding of
reengineering, few are close to being complete.
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the common questions of an often misunderstood
topic. What is reengineering?, Why is it necessary?, How is it implemented? are all
questions that will be answered in this chapter. Forces for change, usually environmental,
cause a basic need for strategic change within an organization. In order to achieve the
desired strategic change, there is often a need for fundamental structural change.
Reengineering is one process by which organizations are able to achieve this fundamental
strategic and structural change. The process is as follows:
Environmental Forces-> Strategic Change-> Reengineering
Organization of this chapter is similar to the flow chart above. First, modem
environmental forces for change are examined. Next the need for strategic change is
discussed. Strategic change mandates the need for structural change. Reengineering is a
process for achieving fundamental business changes. The definitions, implementation
guidelines and outcomes of reengineering are discussed immediately following the
section on structural change. In addition, the meaning and relevance of empowerment and
information technology, as two primary aspects of reengineering, are presented in this
section.
FORCES FOR CHANGE
Environment Forces
Every organization is impacted by environmental forces. The occurrence of a material
change in the environment, such as a new competitor, technology or product, creates the
impetus for organizational change. This section identifies the environmental forces
generating a need for change in today's organizations.
The environment of the 1990's is more complex and turbulent than at any time in the
past. Companies are contending with a broad array of demanding environmental forces:
globalization of business; maturing markets; continuous change in technology, task
complexity and social priorities. Hammer and Champy (1993, pp. 17-24) condense these
environmental forces into the three C's:
" Customer,
* Competition,
" Change.
Customer
Beginning in the early 1980's, the position of strength, historically enjoyed by sellers,
began to shift dramatically in favor of the customer. By the early 1990's, sellers no longer
dominated the relationship - the customers did. As a result, the focus for sellers shifted
from filling mass orders to providing customers with individual attention, quality, price,
selection and service.
Competition
The nature of competition changed with the emergence of niche players, falling trade
barriers and advancing technology. As a result, companies face an increasing number of
competitors. Each competitor strives to offer the lowest price, highest quality and best
service. The intense competition results in continuously rising customer expectations for
goods and services.
Change
For many companies, accelerating change has replaced stability as the normal state. Such
pervasive and persistent change results from the increasing level of competition. To
maintain growth in the face of competition, companies introduce new products. In the
rush to beat the competition, both product life cycles and time for research and
development of new products diminishes.
In commenting upon the pervasiveness of environmental forces, Hammer and Champy
observe:
"In today's environment, nothing is constant or predictable - customer
demand, product life cycles, the rate of technological change, or the nature
of competition."
(1993, p. 17)
All indications imply that these forces are not an aberration, but rather a permanent and
accelerating component of conducting business for any organization. The impact of
environmental forces on an organization is the subject of the next section.
Environment Impacts Strategy
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. defines organizational strategy as "the determination of the basic
long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and
the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals." (1962, p. 13). The
goals and objectives of an organization are determined in accordance with the perception
of environmental forces in which the organization operates. Therefore, organizational
strategy is fashioned in consonance with perceived environmental forces.
Strategy is designed in order for an organization to excel in a particular environment. If
the environment changes, the organizational strategy must correspondingly change to
meet the new set of forces. If the strategy does not change with the environment, then the
organization will eventually cease to exist.
To cope with change in the environment, organizations typically reacted by maintaining
the existing organizational strategy, but improving operations through individual actions
such as cost cutting or additional investment in information technology. In the modem
environment, this course of action by itself provides only a Band-Aid approach and often
proves inadequate.
The three C's impacting today's organization have not just changed the rules, but have
shifted the entire playing field. To continue playing, organizations must create a new
strategy. In creating a new strategy, however, the old organizational structure, the existing
strategy's support mechanism, is incapable of properly supporting and implementing the
new strategy. The need for new organizational structure, as the result of a change in
organizational strategy, is the focus of the next section.
Form Follows Strategy
Chandler defines structure as "the design of the organization through which the enterprise
is administered..." (1962, p. 14). He links organizational strategy and organizational
structure by stating that structure follows strategy:
"That different organizational forms result from different types of growth
can be stated more precisely if the planning and carrying out of such
growth is considered a strategy, and the organization devised to administer
these enlarged activities and resources, a structure. The thesis...is then that
structure follows strategy...."
(1962, p. 14)
If structure is disassociated from strategy, inefficiencies inevitably result. Chandler makes
this observation in the following quote:
"Unless structure follows strategy, inefficiency results... If they failed to
reform lines of authority and communication and to develop information
necessary for administration, the executives were drawn deeper and deeper
into operational activities and were working at cross purposes."
(1962, p. 314)
Just as new strategies are instituted in response to changes in the environment, new
organizational structures are also developed to effectively support the new strategy. The
depth or level of changes in strategy and structure correspond to the frequency of the
company's reassessment of the market and implementation of new strategies and
structures. The relationship between environmental forces, organizational strategy and
organizational structure are diagramatically identified below:
Environmental Forces
Organizational Strategy
Organizational Structure
By not evolving and refining the strategy and structure as environmental changes dictate,
the organization threatens to stagnate and ossify. The greater the shift in market
dynamics without a corresponding shift in an organization's strategy and structure, the
more dramatic and painful the inevitable change to the organization.
The refinement of organizational strategy and structure in response to environmental
forces requires the involvement of the total organization. Beckhard and Harris confirm
this in the following observation:
"It is increasingly necessary in today's complex organizations to have a
planned, managed-from-the-top, organization-wide effort to create a set of
conditions and a state that will allow the organization to "creatively" cope
with the changing outside demands on it and that can also increase the
possibility of organizational survival."
(1977, p. 4)
One "set of conditions" recently applied by organizations searching to " creatively cope
with changing outside demands" is commonly referred to as reengineering. This change
process evolved from the failure of traditional organizations to meet their potential in
today's environment.
Candidates for Reengineering
Any complex, multi-tasking organization is a candidate for reengineering. Potential
entities can be companies from either the service or manufacturing sectors. Typically,
companies in need of reengineering fall into one of three basic categories:
1. Companies in deep trouble - persistent losses, higher costs, falling
revenue. Needed order of magnitude improvement.
2. Trouble up ahead - current operations are fine, but management
perceive approaching threats and adversity.
3. Peak performance - industry leader, no problems. Initiate
reengineering to further the lead over competition.
(Hammer and Champy, 1993, p. 34)
DEFINING BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING
This section first describes a traditional organization and then provides a detailed
presentation of the unique features and scope of business process reengineering. The roles
of information technology and empowerment in the reengineering process, are presented
at the end of this section.
Traditional Structure - A Functional Organization
By mid twentieth century, organizational structures were hierarchical and patterned after
the military and Catholic Church. Command and control were clearly defined. Structure
reflected reporting requirements and control needs. To achieve optimum efficiency,
industrial work was divided into small and simple tasks referred to as specialization of
labor. Workers were only responsible for the performance of their designated task. A well
known example of task specialization was provided by the automobile industry. In the
plant, workers stood beside an assembly line installing the same part over and over.
Reflecting task specialization, many companies organized along major functions.
Examples of functions include R & D, manufacturing, sales, distribution and service.
The various functions of an organization typically acted as independent units in the
following manner: R & D created and designed the product, then passed it to
manufacturing to be made. Sales then sold the finished product, after which distribution
and service fulfilled their responsibilities. Through this type of rigid
compartmentalization, American industry was able to match the phenomenal demand of
mass markets and set performance standards for the business world.
The Process Organization
By the 1970's, the complexity of the environment and availability of sophisticated
technology caused many organizational theorists and organizational leaders to reexamine
basic assumptions of organizational structure. As task complexity increased and old
organizational forms continued to perform inadequately, organization managers designed
or reengineered organizations more capable of meeting the demands of a modern
environment.
One organizational approach focused the company around work requirements or
processes. A process was defined as "any sequence of pre-defined activities executed to
achieve a pre-specified type or range of outcomes." (Talwar, 1993, p.26). The process
approach reunited certain tasks or functions which had become separated in the functional
structure by specialization of labor.
A process consisted of not just one, but several functions. Examples of processes were
new product development, order fulfillment, accounting etc. In the instance of new
product development, the functions of sales, research, manufacturing and distribution
work together to create, build, sell and transport a product. In contrast, the functional
organization would have handled each of these functions in isolation with limited or non-
existent interaction between the functions. The success of processes rests in the
involvement of multiple functions. An organization based on processes, rather than
functions, is considered better able to respond to internal and external pressures.
Element FuncionalAproach Process Approach
Channels of Communication highly structured controlled information flow open-free flow of information
Operations uniform and restricted vary among business units
Authority for Decisions taken within formal line-management position taken by empowered individuals with relevant
expertise
Adaptability slow and reluctant even when business changes as needed in line with continuous
circumstances warrant change improvement
Work Emphasis formal procedures handed down devise own effective processes
Control tight through strict, formal systems devise own measurements in line with fulfilling
process role
Behavior contained by need to follow job role and responsibilities evolved to meet needs
of process
Participation little-information is handed up, decisions down team working with cooperation between teams
Summary Rigid and Slow Flexible and Quick
(Talwar, 1993, p. 30)
With the pressures of the modern environment, companies need to look beyond the
functionally aligned traditional organizations. Although the traditional organization was
efficient at one time, that era is long past. To successfully meet the challenges of the
modem environment, an organization must be flexible, quick and responsive. The
functional organization is incapable of effectively integrating these qualities. In contrast,
the process aligned organization is able to attain a level of flexibility, quickness and
responsiveness unimaginable in a functional orientation. In striving for these qualities,
business process reengineering evolved from the concept of process alignment.
Business Process Reengineering
Beginning in the late 1980' and early 1990's, the concept of process reengineering was
expanded from aligning an organization around processes to include a complete
reappraisal and redesign of the total business. This type of comprehensive organizational
change is referred to as Business Process Reengineering (BPR). BPR provides an
approach to achieving tremendous improvements in customer service and business
efficiency by rethinking and streamlining "the business processes and supporting
architecture through which the organization creates and delivers value." (Talwar, 1993, p.
23).
Common Definitions of Business Process Reengineering
Although slight differences in interpretation exist, the common definition of BPR
provides for a radical redesign of the business leading to tremendous breakthroughs in
performance.
In addition, there is widespread agreement that business reengineering was not about
"down sizing", "restructuring", "right-sizing", "automating", "software reengineering",
"reorganizing", "delayering", "organizational flattening", "busting corporate
bureaucracy", "quality improvement" or "Total Quality Management". These programs
are characterized by ongoing, incremental improvements to existing systems. In contrast,
business process reengineering is characterized as radical, sweeping and all-
encompassing. The process is about reinventing, not modifying.
In the Hayley and Plewa article, Gordon Kerr, Senior Vice President of MIS for Hyatt
Corp., views business process reengineering as customer driven. The purpose of the
change process is for the customer to recognize the changes. To Kerr, reengineering is
"totally changing the way a process works - not just internally but
externally too - so the customer sees the dramatic changes."
(1993, p. 26)
In support, Weber and Kelly also stress the customer's role as the preeminent factor in the
reengineering process:
e "What does the customer want?"
* "How can the customer needs be best satisfied?"
(1993, p. 45)
In addition, Theodore Richman and Charles Koontz view business reengineering in terms
of the potential performance gains for the customer's benefit:
"The radical redesign of work processes, organizational structure,
information technology, job content and flow, to achieve quantum
improvements in customer-valued productivity."
(1993, page 26)
In another area of the Hayley and Plewa article, however, Michael Roche, Senior Vice
President and CIO at Heller International Corp., places more importance on the change in
organizational mind set as opposed to the focus on the customer:
"A lot of people are doing business improvement and wanting to call it
reengineering. But reengineering is different. It is a philosophical change
leading to a dramatic breakthrough - it questions almost everything done in
a particular function and asks, 'Why do we even have this function?'"
(1993, p. 26)
As opposed to the focus on the customer or organizational mind set, Teng, Grover and
Fiedler ("Teng") view the reengineering process strictly in terms of the potential for
improvement in organizational performance: Reengineering is
"the critical analysis and radical redesign of existing business processes to
achieve breakthrough improvements in performance measures."
(1994, p. 10-11)
In agreement with Teng's definition of reengineering, Hammer and Champy expand the
focus on performance by identifying four key determinants necessary to achieve
breakthrough performance:
"Reengineering is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of
business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical,
contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and
speed."
(1993, p. 32)
These four determinants are discussed by Hammer and Champy in their book. (1993, pp.
32-36).
1. Fundamental: Basic questions are posed about the company - "Why do we do what
we do?" and "Why do we do it the way we do it?". Raising these basic questions
forces a review of codified rules and assumptions often revealing them to be obsolete,
erroneous or inappropriate. The reengineering process should be initiated without
preconceived assumptions. Reengineering first determines "what" a company had to
do, then "how" to do it.
2. Radical: The focus is on reinvention, not modification or enhancement. New
concepts are developed and old ones discarded.
3. Dramatic: Quantum improvements, not marginal ones, are envisioned - not a
betterment of 10%, but 500%.
4. Processes: Processes focus on despecializing tasks and regrouping functions across
organizational boundaries.
The Players
In defining BPR it is important to mention the players involved in the process and their
corresponding roles. The types of individuals involved in the BPR process often
determine the success or failure of the initiative. Hammer and Champy identify the key
players typically involved in the process:
* Leader - Senior executive who authorizes and motivates the overall
reengineering effort.
" Process Owner - Manager responsible for a specific process and the
reengineering of that process.
* Reengineering Team - Group of individuals dedicated to the
reengineering of a process - analysis, design and implementation.
e Steering Committee - Policy making body consisting of senior
managers. Responsible for the strategy and monitoring the progress of
the reengineering effort.
* Reengineering Czar - Individual responsible for developing
reengineering techniques and tools and achieving synergy among the
organization's various reengineering projects.
(1993, p. 102)
The natural progression is for the Leader to appoint the Process Owner. The Process
Owner assembles the Reengineering Team. The Team reengineers the process under the
guidance of the Process Owner, Reengineering Czar and the steering committee. The
players and their roles are discussed in more detail in the following:
Leader
The Leader is the locomotive propelling the reengineering effort forward. This is an
executive with the clout and power to turn the organization on its head. Without a
forceful and motivated leader, the reengineering process inevitably grinds down.
Generally, the leader volunteers as opposed to being elected or assigned. This individual
knew change has to occur. The leader's primary responsibility are to provide a vision of
the reengineered company and motivate the members in the organization toward this
vision.
With the new vision, the Leader sets new standards. The Process Owners are charged
with turning the vision and standards into reality. Through the Leader's conviction and
enthusiasm, the organization derives the spiritual energy for the reengineering effort. The
Leader makes people want and believe in the vision.
The Leader demonstrates leadership through signals, symbols and systems. Signals are
explicit communications sent to the organization about the reengineering initiative. They
encompass the basics of what, why and how. Symbols are actions taken by the Leader to
reinforce the signals. Examples of signals include assigning the best people to the
reengineering effort or firing anyone who blocked the effort. The systems are
management systems utilized to reinforce the reengineering message. These systems
measure and reward people's performance in the reengineering process. The systems
focus is to encourage participation and commitment.
Process Owner
The Process Owner is typically a senior executive enjoying prestige, clout and credibility
in the company. After assembling the Reengineering Team, the Process Owner does
whatever is required for the Team to operate: secure resources, run interference with
bureaucracy and enhance cooperation. The Process Owner does not direct or order, but
rather motivates, coaches and advises the Teams.
Reengineering Team
The heavy lifting in the reengineering process is performed by the Reengineering Team.
The Team produce the plans and ideas and then turns them into reality. This is the entity
that actually reinvents the business. With the Process Owner as their client and not their
boss, the Reengineered Teams are largely self-directed.
A Team reengineers only one process at a time. Several Teams are required for the
simultaneous creation of several processes. Teams, consisting of between five and ten
people, are comprised of "insiders" and "outsiders". Insiders work within the process
being reengineered and provide the expert knowledge regarding the process. Because of
their direct involvement in the process, the insiders are considered biased in their frame
of reference. Without a disruptive force, the insiders, being left alone, will reengineer the
same basic process with only slight modifications.
The disruptive force is the outsiders. Outsiders do not work within the process being
reengineered and are often brought from outside the company (i.e. consultants). As a
result, they provide a higher level of objectivity and unique perspective. Outsiders need to
be good listeners, communicators and big-picture thinkers.
Conflicts often arise within the reengineering team. The exchanges of ideas and
comments are healthy. However, turf battles and private agendas are unhealthy. The
active participation of all the members is essential. Active participation means not only
their involvement in the Team sessions, but their time allotment to participate in the
process. For effective results, Team members need to allot a minimum of 75% and
preferably 100% of their work week to Team sessions. A commitment of time less than
the minimum results in dragging out the process and losing steam. In addition, the level
of time allocated for the Team sessions sends an effective signal to the rest of the
organization. The team remains in existence until completion of the reengineering effort.
The Reengineering Team is often supported by part-time and occasional contributors
representing suppliers, other process customers and specialists. The specialists have
expertise in particular disciplines such as Information Technology or human resources.
They provide a support function to the Reengineering Team.
Steering Committee
The Steering Committee, consisting of senior managers, plans the organization's overall
reengineering strategy. The Leader chairs the group. The Steering Committee decides
issues on a macro level. They allocated resources and determine priority among
competing reengineering projects. In addition, the Steering Committee settle disputes
between Process Owners and serves in an advisory capacity to Process Owners and
Reengineering Teams. However, the existence of this group is optional in the
reengineering process.
Reengineering Czar
The Reengineering Czar provides the leadership and guidance for the day to day
reengineering process and serves two primary functions. First, the Czar supports and
enables each Process Owner and Reengineering Team. Second, the Czar coordinates all
reengineering activities. Typically, the Czar is experienced in the reengineering process
and answers all question regarding the implementation of reengineering techniques.
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The steps necessary to design and implement business process reengineering vary by
situation and company. A simple manual, detailing specific steps of reengineering, never
has been nor could be created due to the unique requirements of each company. However,
general principles and commonalties have been identified through the prior reengineering
of several companies and are discussed in this section.
Prior to Reengineering
Prior to starting the reengineering process, a senior manager or a group of like minded
senior managers should accomplish the following:
1. A detailed diagnosis of the fundamental condition(s) causing a need
for change - (what and why);
2. A preliminary, but detailed description or picture of a desired "end
state" - (where to);
3. A clear and accurate picture of the pre-change state in relation to the
change goals or "end state" - (how to get there).
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 17)
What and Why
Through this initial analysis, the manager(s) identifies the primary internal and external
pressures affecting the operations of the organization. These are the "what" or problems
requiring change. The "why" is the reason change will improve operations. This stage is
sometimes referred to as a "case for action."
Although elementary, correctly interpreting the organization's problems and solutions is
the beginning of reengineering. The change process responds to a set of assumptions. If
the assumptions are erroneous, then the change process responds irrelevantly. The result
is irrelevant change. Change for the sake of change is inefficient and leads to disastrous
results. After mistakenly believing they fully understand pressures affecting the
organization, too many managers institute change processes under faulty assumptions.
Where To
The desired "end state" or "where to" are the goals defined by management. These goals
provide a comprehensive description of the future state. Although problems and goals are
interrelated, goals, and not problems, propel the change process. In this manner, the
manager identifies the general direction of the change process.
How
The "how" identifies the means or the steps needed to move from the pre-change state to
the post-change state. It is important to note that this analysis is not detailed, but general
in nature. These initial steps force management to determine where they are, where they
want to go and how to move from here to there. Once determined, the manager has
established a basic framework for the reengineering process.
Steps in Reengineering
After identifying the framework, the senior manager(s) is in a position to begin the
reengineering process. Talwar identifies six key steps in implementing business process
reengineering:
1. Create a clear focus or vision of the reengineered organization.
2. Plan how the vision will be realized.
3. Analyze the current structure and processes.
4. Redesign the business structure.
5. Implement the redesigned organization and processes.
6. Measure the benefits and share the learning.
(1993, p. 31)
1. Vision Statement
The vision statement outlines in general detail a description or image of what the
company wants to be. This step is described by Beckhard as determining the "desired
state" of the organization (Beckhard, 1977, p. 19),. Hammer and Champy define the
vision statement as:
"the way a company's management communicates a sense of the kind of
organization the company needs to become. It describes how the company
is going to operate and outlines the kind of results it must achieve. It is
both a qualitative and quantitative statement, which a company can use
again before and during reengineering, as a reminder of reengineering's
objectives, as a yardstick for measuring progress, and as a prod to keep the
reengineering action going."
(1993, p. 154)
The vision statement builds upon the "case for action". The "case for action" provides the
shock to move the company from the status quo. The vision statement provides the draw
for the organization. A well drawn and articulated image or vision statement often
provides substance and focus for the company through the rigors of the reengineering
process. Hammer and Champy identify three elements of an effective vision statement:
1. Focus on operations;
2. Include measurable objectives:
3. Change the basis for competition in the industry.
(1993, p. 156)
According to Talwar, the effective vision statement "aim[s] to ensure a clear focus on
products ... and ... competencies." (1993, p.31) Importance lay in the current and future
profitability of products. This search for competence involves the analysis of the
following:
* underlying features of the organization's most successful products;
e capabilities in which the organization had a worthwhile and defensible
edge;
e customer requirements and capabilities on which market dominance
hinged;
e results of past approaches to defining and building capability.
2. The Plan
The quality of the reengineering plan is central to the probability of success. The plan is
the road map of the specific steps and events needed to move the organization from the
old to the new. In essence, this is a timetable of "events". Examples of events include the
timing of meetings, decisions, announcements, policies, etc. An effective plan consists of
the following:
1. activities clearly linked to the change goals;
2. activities clearly identified rather than generalized;
3. activities linked or integrated;
4. activities time sequenced;
5. activities flexible and include contingency plans for the unexpected;
6. activities supported and agreed to by senior management;
7. activities are cost effective in terms of financial and human capital.
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 52)
However, the plan is not static, but reviewable. The emphasis is on achieving a desired
state, rather than just completing a series of prescribed activities.
Often the work associated with the action plan is added to the individual's existing
responsibilities. Since the individual's reward systems are typically based on their
traditional responsibilities, individual's primary energies and time tend to focus on their
existing responsibilities, rather than on the action plan or reengineering effort. This threat,
however, is eliminated by having individuals report on both their traditional activities and
reengineering activities and by tying the reward system to the individual's performance
within the action plan.
3. Analysis of Current Structures and Processes
This step expands on the "case for action" by questioning the necessity and viability of
existing structures and processes. The current business is understood in greater detail by
analyzing the following:
* customer requirements;
e target processes;
* organizational issues;
* IT infrastructure;
* candidates for improvement.
(Talwar, 1993, p. 34)
To facilitate this analysis, maps are utilized to identify work flows through the company.
4. The Redesign
After mapping the process, the next step is to identify which processes to reengineer and
in what order. As an example, Hammer and Champy outline the following criteria to
determine this:
1. Dysfunctional - Which processes are in the worst shape. These are
typically self-evident and widely recognized.
2. Importance - Which processes have the greatest impact on the
company' customers.
3. Feasibility - Which processes are capable of redesign in terms of
likelihood and cost. An indicator is the size or scope of the process.
Larger the process, greater the impact, greater the risk of successfully
redesigning. Broader scope meant more orchestration.
(1993, p. 122)
These criteria serve only as general guidelines in making choices. Other issues to be
considered include customer satisfaction, best-in-class performance, etc.
As part of redesign, managers identify parts of the organization affected the most by the
reengineering. Once these areas are identified, the managers determines the following:
e the attitudes of both those subsystems and their leaders toward the
change;
e the readiness of the subsystems and their leaders to commit themselves
to the change;
" an objective assessment of their capability to operate under the change;
e a determination of potential problems arising from the change.
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 27)
This procedure eliminates the consideration of irrelevant subsystems and aids in
clarifying the design strategy. From this point, the manager is able to identify those areas
of the organization to be changed. Examples of required changes are:
* attitude,
" practices,
e policies,
e structures,
" rewards.
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 21)
For acceptance of the new order throughout the organization, the design involves
breaking or "unfreezing" deeply held attitudes or behaviors. This is achieved through
goal-setting, training and direct intervention or oversight by senior management.
Designing is marked by creativity and imagination and abandonment of familiar concepts
and precepts. According to Hammer and Champy, effective redesigns share the following
basic ingredients:
* Organize around outcomes not tasks;
e Have those who use the output of the process perform the process;
" Treat geographically dispersed resources as though they are
centralized;
" Link parallel activities instead of integrating their tasks;
* Place the decision point where the work is performed and build control
into the process.
* Look for opportunities to creatively apply technology.
(1977, page 134-147)
5. Implementation of Design - Structures and Processes
The implementation of the reengineering process dismantles the old and institutes the
new systems and structures. To facilitate the implementation, management devises a
strategy or implementation plan for controlling the inevitable confusion, resulting from
the transition of the old to the new, over roles, responsibility and authority. This phase of
the change process, commonly referred to as the transition period, requires significant
attention and planning from management. Quite often, however, insufficient attention and
resources are allocated to this stage.
Talwar identifies three aspects of an effective implementation plan:
1. Changes affecting parts of the current structure that remain largely
unchanged;
2. Put in place those elements of the structure that undergo substantial
change;
3. Identify changes to be made in future rounds of reengineering.
(1993, p. 37)
Prior to entering the transition period, the manager(s) initiates the following:
1. defines the transition state as a separate period with distinct needs from
the pre-change and post-change state;
2. determine the appropriate form of governance or management
structure;
3. establish the appropriate management structure and system;
4. effectively communicate the existence of the management structure
and system to all related parties.
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 49)
A consideration in identifying a transition management structure is to find an
individual(s) in the organization with the following characteristics:
" Have the clout to mobilize resources necessary to continue the change.
This individual is competing for resources with on-going demands.
" Have the respect of the existing operating leadership and the change
advocates. The individual enjoys a reputation for wisdom and
objectivity.
" Has effective interpersonal skills. Persuasion, rather than force or
formal power, is of greater value.
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 46)
The ability to appoint such an individual(s) to the leadership of transition management
has an impact on the type of structure to implement. There are a variety of temporary
management structures. The implementation of any one structure depends upon the
inherent resources and needs of the organization during the transition.
6. Measuring Benefits
A vital, but difficult, aspect of the change process is measuring the effectiveness of the
change effort. Some of the typical questions raised are listed below:
* How do we know the change effort has been worthwhile?
" Has the change effort worked?
" How do we know the new state will be maintained?
" How do we monitor the change? (Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 85)
Although such questions are important, they are often glossed over and the change
process is not properly evaluated. This typically results from an absence of evaluation
issues in the early stages of the change process and/or lack of measures developed to use
as benchmarks against the outcome of the change process. In addition, general
perceptions often serve as a substitute for formal evaluation.
Formal evaluation is defined as a set of planned, information-gathering, analysis activities
undertaken to provide a satisfactory assessment of the effects of the change effort.
In creating a formal evaluation plan, the following needs are considered:
1. Purpose of the evaluation;
2. Types and sources of information needed by management;
3. Individuals to receive the data from the evaluation;
4. Data collection methods and time and resource constraints;
5. Appropriate time for gathering of data and management review.
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 87)
The objectives of the evaluation plan are:
1. To identify and share the learning on what worked and what could be
improved;
2. To help create a continuous improvement process to support on-going
refinement;
3. To communicate the overall results and encourage others to spot
further opportunities to be addressed in subsequent rounds of re-
engineering.
(Talwar, 1993, p. 37)
Change Management
Reengineering requires major changes in the organization's culture and modifies the
behavior, expectations, attitude and commitment of management and staff. The more
demanding the objectives, the more encompassing the reengineering process. Under such
circumstances, there is a need for effective change management. The following identifies
some of the reasons for resistance to change process in an organization.
Barriers To Change
Reengineering often causes fear, uncertainty and doubt in the organization:
* Senior and middle managers may lose power and authority in the new
structure;
* Potentially flatter organization are perceived to offer fewer promotions
and advancements;
e Rumors abound about the impact of the changes;
" Reengineering often involves layoffs;
* For those remaining, stress is increased from more responsibilities and
the consequences of failure.
(Talwar, 1993, p. 39)
In managing resistance, the following identifies commonly utilized steps:
Gaining Commitment
A broad based commitment is essential to the success of reengineering. The campaign to
gain commitment begins with the realization of the need for reengineering and is not
completed until well after the implementation of the redesigned processes. Throughout
this period, clear and frank communication on the need for reengineering and the
anticipated effects is essential to gain the faith of the employees. Hammer and Champy
contend that two key messages need to be relayed to the employees:
1. Here is where we are as a company and this is why we can't stay here.
2. This is what we as a company need to become.
(1993,p.149)
The first message has to provide a compelling argument for change. If not, the broad
based commitment will not materialize, while overt and covert obstruction will. The
second message provides the employees with a discernible goal. Articulating these
messages forces management to think about the need for change and its effect.
Individuals, whose commitment is essential to the success of the change process, are
identified in the organization. In addition to identifying political commitment, a
systematic analysis is initiated to identify those subsystems, individuals and groups whose
support ensured the successful implementation of the reengineering effort.
In any complex change process, a "critical mass" of committed people has to be
assembled in order to provide the energy and drive necessary to sustain and complete the
change process. The involvement of this critical mass ensures the completion of the
change process.
To identify the critical mass within the organization, the following steps are taken:
1. Identify target groups or individuals whose commitment is essential to
the success of the change process;
2. Define the critical mass needed to ensure the effectiveness of the
change;
3. Develop a plan for securing the commitment from the critical mass;
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 54)
"Project marketing" builds and develops an organization-wide understanding and support
for the reengineering. The purpose is to identify fear, uncertainty and resistance. The key
to this procedure is the implementation of supportive two-way communications.
Management Systems
Two main systems are required to control the change.
1. A system of standards ensuring consistency across projects.
2. Tools to support scheduling, communications and progress reporting.
The following identifies steps to sustain change:
1. Management pays constant attention to continuous transition;
2. Management sets explicit procedures for prioritizing additional
improvements;
3. Management establishes systematic and continual processes of
feedback;
4. Management rewards individuals for spending time and energy on
these processes.
(Beckhard and Harris, 1977, p. 100)
However, the best way to establish an effective change management program is to learn
from the mistakes made in other reengineering efforts. These common errors are
identified in the following subsection.
Common Errors
The most difficult part of the change process:
"is not the process leading to the changeover but the period immediately
afterward...Change, the corporate order of the day, is often only skin deep.
The old bureaucracy is remarkably resilient. Often it is only in remission.
It is the rehabilitation phase, which comes after the ax has been wielded,
that is fraught with danger. Fundamental change takes years. Superficial
improvements can be achieved in a shorter time, but the real bureaucracy
is only bent, not beaten....CEOs get blind sided in the period immediately
after initial reform. Absent the animation of daily change, the tendency is
to throttle back to routine. Unless one is on guard, the old ways edge
back......"
(Budd, 1993, p. 32)
In his article, Talwar identifies another threat:
"Experience suggests that those who have tried to re-engineer often fail if
they focus all their attentions in one area alone such as technology.
Similarly, organizations, which choose a balanced approach but then set
targets far beyond the sights of those involved, have also found the
exercise failing."
(1993, p. 33)
Sources of Risk
Chandler identified two main sources of risk involved with reengineering. The first are
the risks associated with the change itself - complexity of planned change, career risk for
those involved and the speed of the change. The second source stems from the company's
previous attempts to change in the past (Chandler, 1962, p. 104-106).
Hammer and Champy identify other common errors resulting in failure of the
reengineering process:
e Instead of reengineering, conduct process changes and then consider
them reengineered.
* Instead of focusing on business processes, focus on teamwork,
automation, empowerment, etc.
* Instead of welcoming change, feel fear and try to limit change.
* Consider communication and motivation as unnecessary.
* Marginal improvement is more attractive than the pain of
reengineering.
" Retreat too early - first sign of difficulty or success.
* Utilize old concepts and precepts in reengineering process.
e Those responsible for reengineering are uncomiitted and
unknowledgeable of the process.
* Bury reengineering in the middle of the corporate agenda.
* Reengineer all the processes at one time.
* Attempt to reengineer when the CEO was two years from retirement.
" Fail to distinguish reengineering from other business improvement
programs.
" Concentrate on only redesigning without thought or focus on
implementation.
* Pull back at first sign of resistance.
* Prolong the reengineering effort beyond a focused time period.
(1993, pp. 200-212)
Weber and Kelly identify high level executive sponsorship - "the higher, the better" -
(1993, p. 45) as the most critical factor in reengineering. If the CIO or CEO is not
involved in the initiative, the process has a "much smaller chance of success because
reengineering .... cuts across the entire firm, including operating units and functions..."
(Weber and Kelly, 1993, p. 45). The senior sponsorship also assures time and resources
are devoted to the effort.
Daniel Dvorak, Vice President of MIS for Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers Inc., observes in
the Hayley and Plewa article that "success or failure is directly related to the buy-in you
get at the department level when you embark on the project. The business process, not the
technology must drive the effort. Some of these reengineering projects could have been
done even without advanced technology." (Hayley and Plewa, 1993, p. 30)
During the change process, individuals set aside time and energy from their normal
responsibilities to organize the change. Once the change have been instituted, people are
expected to return to their basic responsibilities. At this point, the threat exists that
activities related to the change process are relegated to "extracurricular activities." This is
detrimental to maintaining and furthering the change process.
Section Summary
This identified steps and types of individuals needed for successfully implementing
business process reengineering. In addition, this section identified steps to ensure a
successful change process and common errors made in implementation. The next section
summarizes the expected outcomes from BPR.
CHARACTERISTICS AND RESULTS OF BPR
Hammer and Champy identify the following common characteristics in reengineered
companies regardless of industry orientation or business focus:
* Tasks are reunited
* Workers become decision makers;
e Flexibility;
e Single point of contact;
* Centralized/Decentralized Operations
(1993, pp. 51-63)
Tasks Are Reunited
The specialization of labor or assembly line is absent in a reengineered organization.
Formerly distinct jobs or tasks are integrated and compressed into one process.
Workers Become Decision Makers
In the functional organization, decision making authority is consciously separated from
the worker and assigned to the manager. In the reengineered company, the workers within
processes have authority to make decisions.
Flexibility
In serving mass markets, standardization was the key to success and resulted in rigid and
inflexible functional structures. In the environment of the 1990's, however,
standardization is the key to failure. To move quickly from one opportunity to another,
reengineered companies are capable of easily creating multiple versions of the same
process. Each version is designed to meet the needs of a particular customer or market.
Single Point of Contact;
One individual interacts with the customer and assumes responsibility for the customer's
needs. To answer and solve customer problems, this individual is able to make decisions
and act.
Centralized/Decentralized Operations
By employing information technology, reengineered companies operate with autonomous
individual units.
Empowerment
In Empowerment in Organizations, Judith Vogt (1990, p. 8) defines employee
empowerment as intensifying the employee's level of input and involvement in an
organization by allowing the employees, at the lowest appropriate levels, to make
and implement decisions. Employee empowerment builds, develops and increases
the power of an organization through employees cooperating, sharing, and
working together. It is based on a synergistic, not a zero-sum, assumption about
power. Rather than merely redistributing power, empowerment is assumed to
enlarge the power and potential of an organization. However, the effect of
empowerment becomes muted unless the employees making those decisions also
become responsible for their success or failure.
Empowerment realigns the decision making process with those responsible for the
business processes. This allows a for quicker, more effective decision making
within an organization. When making decisions and taking action, employees
become more interested and involved in the effectiveness of the organization
(Aubrey, 1988, pp. 1-4). With active employee participation, there is an increase
in employee commitment and involvement. By allowing employees to serve as
experts and provide input on ways to improve operations, management
acknowledges the employee as a resource of knowledge and expertise in their
particular areas. Through empowerment, the potential of a work force is more
fully utilized by tapping into worker's brain power and creative aptitudes.
Senge (1990, p.4) identifies the following potential advantages of empowerment:
e Higher productivity and quality;
* Faster, more-flexible product development;
* Greater employee satisfaction;
e Heightened understanding of customer needs;
e More accurate knowledge of internal business processes.
Eccles (1993, p. 13) considers the benefits of empowerment to be increased
employee involvement. This has the potential of enhancing productivity and
quality by finding better ways to organize and carry out tasks. Since
empowerment enables employees to influence changes in their roles,
improvement can be made more effectively.
Fundamentals of Employee Empowerment
In High-Involvement Management, Lawler (1986) identifies four fundamentals of
employee empowerment:
1. power,
2. information,
3. rewards,
4. knowledge.
(pp. 26-30)
Power
Employees or groups are given the authority to make and implement decisions in
a particular area or situation. For example, decisions on task completion, hiring,
strategy, implementation, etc. are determined by the job holder in an empowered
organization. In a traditional organization, these decisions are typically made by
management or other supervisors of the job holders.
According to Lawler, the level of participative power or decision making should
vary depending on the particulars of each company. However, some amount of
significant decision making should exist in the lower levels of an organization in
order to raise the level of employee participation.
Information
Information is the lifeblood of most organizations. For empowerment to work,
information must be shared among employees throughout the organization.
Without information easily flowing up, down and laterally, employee decision-
making becomes inefficient and even dangerous.
Rewards
Rewards are an important aspect of worker motivation. There are two types of
rewards: intrinsic (internal) or extrinsic (external). Empowerment raises the level
of both types of rewards. Examples of intrinsic rewards are an individual's
feelings of pride or self worth in completing a meaningful job or being involved in
an important decision. Examples of extrinsic rewards include salary, bonuses,
promotions, etc.
Knowledge
Management and employees need relevant knowledge to successfully perform
their responsibilities when making decisions, working on jobs, or solving
problems. Training helps the members of the organization develop knowledge.
The amount and type of training provided to employees has a direct impact on
work quality and amount of worker participation.
Lawler observes a significant difference between training individuals on how to
do a job and training individuals to think about their roles and the organization.
The latter enables the individuals to participate in a much broader spectrum of
decision-making and allows them different expectations as to what type of input
they should be providing.
Through these four fundamental components of employee empowerment, business
process reengineering is provided with the means to initiate and implement the change
process. Without providing employees with the ability to make decisions and take action,
the reengineering process will grind to a halt. Due to its decision making component,
employee empowerment is a more important enabler than IT in business process
reengineering.
Information Technology
Historically, organizations applied Information Technology ("IT") only to work faster.
Technology was often equated with automation. With little consideration beyond
automating existing work-flow systems, functionally-focused computer systems were
imprinted over functionally-focused paper systems. Hammer and Champy alluded to this
as "paving the cow paths." (1993, p.104)
When over-laid on existing functional systems, even the most state-of-the-art computer
systems are unable to achieve major advances in performance. Successfully implementing
new technology requires more than installing new computers or fiber optic cable. New
technology requires a reexamination of the way work is performed and the nature of the
organization. The potential benefits of IT correspond only with the degree of changes in
organizational characteristics. Kelly and Weber (1993) address this issue in the
following:
"But if they ("Information Technology") are implemented in a vacuum -
simply added to existing automation procedures for problem resolution,
moves/adds/changes, large-scale change management and capacity
planning - the result will be increased chaos. Before new systems are
adopted, it makes sense to essentially start over and adopt a different frame
of reference..." (p. 45)
The real power of Information Technology (IT) is not improving the speed of tasks, but
enabling companies to discard old rules and create new ways of working that were
previously unimagined or impossible. Hammer and Champy (1993) observe:
"Information technology plays a crucial role in business
reengineering.....Modern, state of the art information technology is part of
any reengineering effort, an essential enabler...., since it permits
companies to reengineer business processes." (p.82)
As a result, reengineering places new demands on IT. These demands include improved
communication skills, greater business understanding, easy information flow across
functional and departmental lines and flexible business networks.
N. Venkatraman (1994) proposes a hierarchy of five levels of IT-enabled business
transformations. Each level is characterized by an increasing revolutionary aspect:
1. Localized Exploitation - deployment of standard IT applications with
minimal changes to the business practice. Underleverages IT's
potential.
2. Internal Integration - more systematic attempt to leverage IT
capabilities throughout (seamless) the entire business process.
Technical interconnectivity and organizational interdependence.
Minimal change in the business process.
3. Business Process Redesign - benefits from IT not realized if
superimposed on current business processes. IT should be used as a
lever for designing new structure and business process.
4. Business Network Redesign - redesign of the nature of exchange
among multiple participants in a business network through effective
deployment of IT. Boundaryless. Leverage systems to create
interdependent processes, enhance decision making or provide
distinctive value added services.
5. Business Scope Redefinition - Redefining the corporate scope that is
enabled and facilitated by IT functionality.
(pp. 74-84)
The use of Localized Exploitation and Internal Integration sought organizational
efficiencies by modifying existing business practices. In contrast, Business Process
Redesign, Business Network Redesign and Business Scope Redefinition enhances
organizational capabilities by allowing the organization to redesign. The difference
between efficiency and enhancement is significant.
Through continual improvement and change, IT offers to organizations potential future
modification or enhancement capability. The key is to maintain awareness of continual
advances in IT and incorporate applicable changes as an on-going process.
Although IT is an important component of the reengineering process, the motivation for
IT implementation must come from the business side and not from IT. Hammer and
Champy comment on IT's importance to a reengineering effort:
"As an essential enabler in reengineering, modem information technology
has an importance to the reengineering process that is difficult to overstate.
But companies need to beware of thinking that technology is the only
essential element in reengineering."
(1993, pp. 101)
Clearly, Information Technology is a major component of business process reengineering.
IT provides the information and systems enabling business process reengineering to
occur. However, IT is at best only an essential enabler, and not the driving force, of this
change process. In fact, IT is not the only significant enabler of business process
reengineering. The other primary enabler of reengineering is the subject of the final topic
in this section.
Other Outcomes
BPR changes almost every aspect of an organization and its employees. It evolves jobs
from being task or function-oriented to being multidimensional, process-oriented. People
formerly receiving orders, now make decisions. Managers evolve from supervisors to
coaches. Attitudes and values change as a result of the new initiatives. Hammer and
Champy identify other outcomes commonly experienced:
" Work units change from functional to process team orientation;
e Jobs change from simple tasks to multidimensional;
" Worker roles change from controlled to empowered and self-directed;
e Workers follow their judgment, not company rules;
* Shift from training (the teaching of "how" of a specific task) to
education (the teaching of "why" and understanding);
* Performance and compensation measures shift from activity to results
based;
e Basis of promotion changes from performance based to ability based;
e Values change from satisfying boss to satisfying customer;
e Managers evolve from supervisors to coaches;
e Organizational structures change from hierarchical to flat;
" Executives change from scorekeepers to leaders.
(1993, pp. 64-80)
SUMMARY
Business Process Reengineering is a complicated and painful change process requiring
commitment from all involved. The process is not just about reshaping, but about
reinventing. All aspects of the organization are open to scrutiny.
In BPR, the role of the business environment often provides the driving force for the
organizational change process. In order for a company to survive and grow, it must be
able to adapt its strategy to the changes in the environment. Changes in strategy should
lead to changes in structure in order to for the company to support its new strategic
initiatives. The literature review showed that BPR is one means to realize new
organizational structure.
Two important components of BPR are information technology (IT) and empowerment.
IT provides greater access to information throughout the organization. Empowerment
enables employees to use the information to make decisions. Without empowering the
workers, neither the information nor the employees are used to their full potential.
In order to facilitate the understanding of this chapter, the following matrix identifies the
significant definitional and implementational aspects of BPR. The matrix follows the
organization of this chapter. It begins with the Forcesfor Change and the Candidatesfor
Reengineering sections. The Definitions of BPR are then introduced along with the
Players involved in process. The Implementation Process is then outlined, and the matrix
concludes with Characteristics and Results section.
This matrix can be useful to any organization who has gone through or is considering
BPR. An organization that has undergone BPR can apply its case to the matrix and use it
as a tool for reflection. Those organizations considering BPR can use the matrix as a
check list for the components of BPR. The columns labeled Present, Not Present,
Present w/Qualifier, and Brief Explanation allow for a customized assessment to be
made. They will be used in the application of the case study to the matrix in Chapter
Four.
Figure 1: Business Process Reengineering Matrix
Characteristics/Definitions Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
Qualifier
Forces for Change
Change in Market Conditions
Client Demands
Increasing Competition
Continuous Change
Form Follows Strategy
Candidates for reengineering
Companies in deep trouble
Trouble up ahead
Companies that want to
continue peak performance
Definitions
Radical redesign of business
along processes
Fundamental
Customer oriented
Tremendous potential
breakthroughs in performance
The Players
Leader
Process Owner
Reengineering Team
Steering Committee
Reengineering Czar
Steps in Implementation
Create a Vision Focusing on
Operations
Picture of "end state"
Customer requirements
.......................................... ................... ........................................ 
-.... ... ................... .. -...  . ................. .
Features of company's most
successful products --- _---
Capabilities with worthwhile
and defensible edge
Include measurable objectives
Analyze Current Structure
and Processes
Target processes
Organizational issues
Readiness of systems/leaders
to change
Assessment of capability to
.0perate under chane. .  .. .. ........... . .. .. ...... I gF ............ ...... ........ . ...... ... ...
Determination of potential
L problems from change
IT infrastructure
................ ...................... ......................................................... 
... .. ..... ....-......... ... .......-. . . .
Redesign business structure
Reorganize processes
according to analysis
performed
Are activities cost
effective -
human/financial capital?
Is individual's reward
system linked to
performance?
Identify which processes
to reorganize first by:
Dysfunction
Importance
Feasibility
Implement Redesigned
Organization and Processes
Measure the benefits and
share learning
Characteristics and Results of
Reorganization
Tasks are Reunited with
Grou/Individual Rer onsible
Flexibility for Further Change
Efficient and Responsive
Completion of Tasks
Checks and controls reduced
Single point of contact
Characteristics and Results of
..Empowerment
Employee power to make decisions
Employee responsibility for
decisions
Increased commitment and
involvement in o..aniz.tio ......... . .. .....
Greater effectiveness- more fully
utilize brain power and creative
aptitudes
Information shared among
.Cmployees
.. ..m.. . . lo ... ... ..ee. .. ... .. . -.. .  . ... ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .Proper knowledge - training
Characteristics and Results of
IT
Create new ways of working
Enables structural organizational
changes
Better communication skills
Greater business understanding
Easy information flow across
departments
Flexible business networks
This chapter presented and explained BPR . The next chapter presents a case study of one
company that initiated and implemented BPR . The case study vivificates many of the
concepts discussed in this chapter, and the analysis will compare theory to reality.
CHAPTER THREE
CASE STUDY:
COPLEY REAL ESTATE ADVISORS
SETTING
Joe O'Connor, President and Chief Executive Officer of Copley Real Estate Advisors
(Copley), gazed out of his corner office on the top floor of the company's headquarters.
Copley was a company distinguished from among competitors in the real estate
investment industry with its tremendous growth and track record through the 1980's.
O'Connor created and guided Copley from its inception in 1982.
O'Connor contemplated the changes which had taken place at Copley over the previous
eight months, changes which had resulted in a complete reordering of the company's
organizational structure and in its orientation towards dealing with its external
constituents. O'Connor knew of the mixed emotions among his employees and
executives: excitement and eagerness to move forward with the new organization;
uncertainty and some anxiety as to the whether the objectives of the reorganization were
going to be met. The implemented changes were hoped to set the company back on the
road to becoming an industry leader. After months of intense review, analysis, discussion
and planning, Copley and its people faced a number of unanswered questions, but they
were prepared to meet the challenges ahead with a renewed sense of energy and
commitment.
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPANY
Copley Real Estate Advisors was formed in January, 1982 as a spin-off from the New
England Life Insurance Company (NEL). Copley's charter from New England was to
manage the insurer's real estate portfolio, valued at the time at $1.3 billion, and to make
equity real estate investments on behalf of both NEL and new investors. O'Connor, a
1972 Harvard M.B.A. graduate, had been a Vice President of real estate and mortgages at
NEL. He was the driving force behind the creation of the new offshoot, and brought with
him 13 NEL people who had worked together for a number of years. Thirteen of the
fourteen
founding members of the company were still with Copley in April 1994, most of them in
senior management.
The Copley mission was to leverage the real estate expertise of its founding members by
bringing in outside funds to put together bigger transactions than those that were being
undertaken "in-house" at The New England. Its investment strategy was what
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distinguished it from its competitors in the real estate investment advisory business.
Copley aligned itself with local developer partners in selected large growth markets
throughout the US and provided to the developers, through its investors, the equity capital
to proceed with new income-producing development projects. It also focused its
investments primarily in industrial properties and, to a lesser extent, on R&D and office
projects.
These strategies capitalized on several strengths. Investment in new projects, due to the
inherent leasing, construction cost and financial risks, brought in higher returns than
achievable through the acquisition of comparable existing real estate assets. By working
in tightly-knit, long-term joint ventures with premier local developers, Copley was able to
maximize knowledge and contacts in those markets. These resources were seen to be
essential in improving investment return through faster and easier approval processes,
faster lease-up, and new leads to fuel future growth. Specialization in a few specific
markets and in relatively small number of product classes allowed Copley to develop
expertise in those markets and assets.
The development partner was the core element of Copley's investment strategy. The
company worked very hard to establish strong links to a region's most successful
developers, the majority of which entered into exclusive arrangements with Copley.
O'Connor viewed the company's relationships with its partners akin to a marriage, and
sought in its partners the type of qualities one might look for in a spouse: honesty,
integrity, a strong work ethic and somebody that they would want to live with for a long
time. The partner's knowledge of the local marketplace was vital.
Copley often found that there was not an overabundance of developers in a given market
that could meet its expectations. Given the developer's importance in delivering the
investment product, Copley valued these relationships and they received a great deal of
personal attention from O'Connor. The developer partner came to be viewed as Copley's
principal customer needing to be serviced.
Copley's primary source of investment capital outside NEL was US pension funds, which
through the 1980's increased the proportion of equity real estate carried in their
portfolios. The funds principal objectives were to provide greater asset diversification
and to serve as what was perceived as being an inflation hedge coming out of the high
inflation era of the 70's and early 80's. Loosened credit regulations, favorable tax
treatment for income-producing property, a fast-growing labor force and the burgeoning
economy that prevailed through much of the Reagan years created a booming
development market and spiraling prices for the assets already owned and being
developed.
As the value of the pension funds' real estate assets increased, Copley did not have any
difficulty finding money to finance new projects. As one of the early employees
reflected, "When Copley got started ... it was slow for the first couple of years, but then
we caught the wave and everyone wanted to literally throw money at real estate." One of
Copley's senior executives, who was not with the company during the 80's, observed:
"Its strategy was a bull market strategy and it executed it perfectly. It was
able to put out more money than anybody else on that strategy, because it
had developed a very good distribution system to put the money out. And
it was respected, broadly respected for that. And while it worked for 3, 4, 5
years in a row, it was #1 in returns, and the money came in over the
transom."
Assets under management had grown from 1982's $1.3 billion to $15 billion by
1990. The full time employee count increased from the original 14 to 152 in the
same time frame. Copley did not take equity position in the projects. Rather,
Copley's remuneration was generated from fee income, based on appraised values
of the properties, either levered or unlevered. The leapfrogging fee income,
resulting from the staggering, growth in the asset base, allowed the Copley
principals and senior executives to be well compensated. Life was good.
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT FROM 1990-1992
By 1990, however, the real estate environment had changed radically from the high
water-mark of the 1980's. The same easy money, aggressive building conditions which
dominated much of the 80's resulted in an enormous amount of over building in most
markets and most sectors. The national economy endured one of its worst recessions
since the 1930's through much of 1991 to 1993. Beyond a normal economic cycle, basic
structural changes in the economy were taking place. Companies downsized employment
ranks by thousands to cut costs and improve productivity, rapidly improving computer
technology allowed companies to do more with less people, just-in-time inventory
systems allowed manufacturers and retailers to reduce warehousing requirements.
Vacancy rates in major office markets across the country climbed over 20% and in some
cities reached the 30% level. Effective rent levels tumbled. Savings & Loan failures
brought billions of dollars of real estate to the market through government bodies,
principally the Resolution Trust Corporation. Banks and insurers took back huge
volumes of defaulted properties and repackaged these to an already flooded market.
Traditional financing sources dried up and lenders often balked at financing renewals or
drove down loan amounts.
These factors combined to significantly devalue real estate asset values across the country
and Copley's bull market strategy met with very hard times. A Copley senior executive
recalled:
"When 1990 rolled around, we found ourselves flatfooted with probably
three of the worst elements involved in a strategy - land, leverage and
development. As a result, we probably had more than our share of
problems to deal with. So we made the conscious decision in 1990 and
1991 to really focus on correcting the problem to the exclusion of going
out and finding new business. At that point in time there was enough
revenue coming from our existing project base and our profit margins were
such that we could afford to be out of the new business environment at
that point while we corrected the problems with our portfolios. Everybody
in the organization was focused on short term problem solving."
Another Copley executive estimated that industry asset values fell through the correction
30% to 60% "across the board". As investors in Copley's funds realized significantly
reduced and sometimes negative returns, investors and lenders demanded more and more
information. With Copley's development partners suffering under their own staffing and
financial difficulties, Copley struggled to respond to the investor's new information
requirements. In addition, investors began to demand greater control and liquidity over
the assets. Some investors even decided to pull their money out of the funds. As a result,
Copley sold $900 million of assets during 1993 and $800 million during 1992 alone. The
company's appraised asset base under management as of 1994 was down to $9.5 billion,
which represented a reduction of more than one-third since 1990.
The reduced property appraisals resulted in an enormous reduction to Copley's fee
income. Yet while revenues declined, Copley's expenses rose to meet the information
demands of the investors. The company became inundated with questionnaires and
requests for information from the investors and their consultants. Staff and additional
computer equipment were added to try to deal with the load with the full-time employee
count reaching 170 by 1993, further pressuring the company's bottom line.
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT OF 1993
Moving into 1993, most real estate markets across the country had bottomed out, and
values had begun to stabilize. The one significant exception to that, particularly painful to
Copley because of its significant investments in the region, was southern California. The
recession in southern California lasted longer and reached deeper than the rest of the
country, with its economy being hard hit by the impact of military spending cutbacks on
the area's defense contractors, base closings and associated layoffs. Investors in these
funds were continuing to see their returns and property values "turn south", whereas other
advisory firms less sensitive to California and less leveraged were starting to see things
turn around.
More significantly, however, the format of investment in real estate was moving in new
directions. With traditional lenders forced out of the market and continuing to bail out of
problem portfolios by regulatory and policy decisions, investors turned to the public
market for refinancings, both debt and equity. Equity financings through publicly traded
real estate investment trusts (REITs) became very popular. REITs offered two
characteristics that responded to inherent shortcomings with Copley's closed-end fund
investment format: daily valuations through the stock market and instant low-cost
liquidity. With the growing perception that market corrections had brought real estate
values back to realistic levels through 1992 into early 1994, value-oriented investors
began coming back to the market through the acquisition of single assets and portfolios,
often through securitized financing vehicles. Interest rates had fallen to historically low
levels by the fall of 1993, and yields offered by securitized debt and equity instruments
began to look attractive by comparison.
Copley was not in these securitization businesses, and their accessibility to the public
markets was hampered by the fact that the company lacked one of the main ingredients
sought by the public markets and Wall Street - strong information reporting and research
functions. The gathering and reporting of property information had become a nightmare
because individual developer partners were allowed to report information in their own
formats, often on their own schedules and on a variety of systems. One senior executive
commented that without a solid information and research effort, the company was
"rudderless to examine itself'.
COPLEY ORGANIZATION: 1982-1993
During this period, Copley created and modified an organizational structure to
successfully operate and excel in the business environment of the 1980's. The following
discusses some of the noteworthy aspects of this system.
Corporate Culture (Skills)
Due to the speed at which the company grew and the number of development projects
completed in the 1980's, a corporate culture developed at Copley surrounding "the deal".
That corporate culture was clearly transaction oriented, focused on bringing in new
money and putting together the next deal to put that money to work. The company
became populated with people motivated by that culture, led from the top by Joe
O'Connor himself. They referred to themselves as "deal junkies". Service to the investors
was secondary, and while property values increased and returns were high, that did not
cause a significant concern among the capital sources. In the words of one employee:
"You had a deal driven company that sold equity on a transactional basis -
hop on a plane, get on the phone, do a deal kind of thing. Everything else,
well, they're just details, we won't worry about those."
This corporate culture created a fast-paced, pressured working environment, with 80 to 90
hour weeks not untypical. However, stress from the workload had become such an issue
to some that by 1990 the company began to encourage people to work fewer hours.
Family Atmosphere
A prevalent aspect of the corporate culture at Copley was a sense that the company was
like a family, dominated by a paternalistic Joe O'Connor, the founding father. To quote
one junior employee:
"Copley is very much a family-oriented environment. The people who
work here are just generally nice people. They're fun and they're very
smart people. You really could walk into anybody's office at anytime of
day and say 'Could you help me out?' or 'Could you explain something to
me?' That's always been the case and that still is the case."
In reflecting on O'Connor's role, the individual went on to say:
"Joe is very much the father of the family, meaning he cares very much
about what happens to Copley and he cares about the people in the
company, but he wants to make sure that this company is delivering
everything they promised to the investors."
Although people generally enjoyed the familial atmosphere at Copley, that feeling, for
many, had diminished as the company grew. One employee elaborated on the perceived
changes:
"When I first started working here... it was definitely a family. At that
point the company was growing tremendously, and I think we lost the
family atmosphere. I think that's what Joe based his company on, and it
was a good thing, and it was a good place to work, it was a good
atmosphere, a good bunch of people. But I think we got too big in the early
90's, and it became bureaucratic and political. The family atmosphere kind
of got lost behind."
Another individual commented:
"It was a nice place to work. People were generally nice to everybody.
They helped everybody. They respected each other. I still see that to some
degree, but not as much as when I first started. But people really cared
about others, and about what it takes to get someone's job done, and what
they go through. Now its sort of 'just get your job done, period.' I see that
some of the rewards, not necessarily monetary, have gone away. People
were just so swamped that they didn't have time to look out for anybody
but themselves, just to get the work out the door. So I think that took away
from the family. It became more selfish."
One of the company's senior executives offered qualified agreement:
"I think that once we got beyond 35-40 people, once we got over $4 - $5
billion in assets under management, it's kind of tough to sustain that
family atmosphere. That doesn't mean you can't have very important
values and have a corporate culture that is very people supportive."
As a result of this family orientation, Copley provided a security blanket or "cocoon" for
many of the employees. Even though profits had been shrinking, "We kept jobs and there
was sort of a safety here that Copley was my cocoon." One observer commented:
"This company had provided an element of economic, intellectual and
emotional security. We tried to operate it as a family. We always tried to
provide emotional stability, economic stability and all those things. But the
real world does not provide those things."
O'Connor As Chief
O'Connor was always a very strong leader and actively involved in every area of Copley.
In 1982, Copley was a twelve person organization, and it was manageable for the CEO to
be involved in all aspects of the company. Indeed, O'Connor said of Copley in its
infancy: "If someone sneezed, eleven other people would yell 'Gesundheit.' "
As the company grew, however, it was neither possible for Copley to remain as cohesive
a group, nor for O'Connor to be effectively involved in the minutiae. According to one
senior manager:
"It was very effective when you had a company of 10. But when you get
up to a company of 170, it just promotes gridlock."
When the market turned down in the early 1990's and Copley was adversely
affected, a senior manager commented on O'Connor's reactionary passion for
control:
"Joe was a control freak...Everything had to go through his office before it
went out the door... Everyone was afraid to make decisions so they were
running everything by Joe."
Another senior manager commented:
"The company was like 150 people, all in a line with every one equal.
Then there's Joe, who's like a blip that comes up in the middle. Joe in the
late '80s was really ready to let people take on more responsibility. But
then the market deteriorated, and O'Connor's desire for control came out
and he pulled back. If you started a business, and you saw it grow, I think
it's kind of an intuitive reaction. Clearly to grow and move forward, Joe
had to change this instinct."
Compensation System
Copley's compensation system consisted of a base salary plus bonus structure. Lower
level people had the potential to earn a bonus of 10% to 15% of their salary and higher
level people could earn 40% to 50% of base. The payout of the bonus pools at the lower
levels was based on individual performance and the higher end is based on corporate
performance. In addition, the system included a 15% profit sharing payout based on
corporate performance measures. Profit sharing was available to everyone in the
organization and everyone received the same payout, from top to bottom.
Throughout the 1980's, compensation was a point of contention for many people. A
majority of the mid-level and junior managers believed their compensation was inferior in
comparison to comparable positions at other firms.
In 1991 and 1992, salary increases were frozen resulting from the combination of
continued pressure on the bottom line and the absence of new business prospects. As a
result of Copley's shrinking asset base, opportunity for advancement was limited.
Compensation packages for the most senior executives was down to 1/5 to 1/4 of what
they had been earning in the 80's.
And Then Depression Set In
For reasons other than money alone, the mood in the office by 1990 had changed
significantly from the boom period of the 1980's. O'Connor observed:
"When all you're dealing with is bad news and problems, a fifty hour week
is an awfully long week. When you're dealing with great things, new
things, new products and services, growth, 90 hours is a very short week."
A senior executive commented on the period:
"We've been through ... four years of fighting fires, trying to keep the
investors at bay... It's been close to a bunker mentality over the past four
years."
A junior level employee reflected on the mood during this period:
"Real estate markets were really bad. People were very depressed around
here. I think often times its very hard for people to separate their personal
lives from their work. A lot of people take tenants going bankrupt and all
that stuff personally and bring it home with them. So it depressed a lot of
people."
Structure
The company was structured along functional lines. The following list identifies the ten
(10) divisions:
Figure 2: Old Company Functions
Division Description
* New Products & Services Generating new business lines
* Portfolio Management Managing the portfolios
* Asset Management Managing the real estate assets
* Management Information Systems Computer services and data processing
* Administration General administrative duties
* Client Relations Servicing the client
e Accounting/Finance General internal finance functions
* Legal Performed all legal services for Copley
* Production Deal makers - joint venture origination
* Asset Sales Disposition of assets
The organizational chart, found in Appendix A, represents the company's organizational
hierarchy of June, 1993. This chart clearly illustrates the multi-level, hierarchical
structure of Copley. At that time, the company had eight titles in its hierarchy: President,
Chief Operating Officer, Chief Investment Officer, Managing Director, Vice President,
Senior Manager, Manager and Associate. These titles provided both a reporting structure
within the various functional groups and a clear avenue for promotion and growth within
the company. The following table identifies the number of people with various titles:
Number
Title Of People
* President 1
" Chief Operating Officer 1
* Chief Investment Officer I
* Managing Director 10
* Vice President 20
* Senior Managers 28
* Managers 29
* Associates 78
The following table reflects the number of people assigned to the major functions:
Number
Function of People
* Asset Management 42
* Accounting/Finance 40
* Portfolio Management 23
* Management/Administration 23
* Legal 11
" Client Relations 9
e Asset Sales 7
* Production 6
* New Product and Services 1
The hierarchical structure reinforced the autocratic character of a company often
described in the following terms: "O'Connor was Copley, Copley was O'Connor."
Starting with O'Connor as the head, the company was managed from the top down.
Subordinates were expected to carry out and comply with the directives of the leader - Joe
O'Connor.
The company was headed by an Executive Committee, consisting of four of the original
principals: O'Connor, the President and CEO, who had the corporate functions of
administration, accounting/finance, legal and client relations reporting to him; Dan
Coughlin, Chief Operating Officer, responsible for portfolio and asset management and
management information systems; Kevin Mahoney, Chief Investment Officer, responsible
for new development (referred to as "production") and asset sales and Steve Anthony,
Managing Director. The Executive Committee made all investment and major policy
decisions.
Roles In The Functional Organization
This functional hierarchy created segmentation in which each group placed its own self-
interest first. Reporting structures, performance evaluations and reward systems were
based on performance within the functional areas. As a result, information was not shared
effectively between the groups. Some groups relied on other groups for information as
input into their own reporting or decision making. Inevitably, delays in the processing of
reports or information from one group to another would create logjams.
Decision Making Process
This problem was exacerbated by the Company's lengthy and confusing decision making
processes. As the market turned, the Executive Committee, especially Joe O'Connor,
wanted to maintain final decision-making authority on most matters. As a result, many
decisions were routed upward. One employee observed that O'Connor created the
impression of wanting "to see everything, down to the color of the carpet". Recognizing
that he could not control and did not want to take part in all the decisions of the company,
O'Connor attempted to keep the less important memos, meetings and decision making
out of his office. However, this cycle was firmly entrenched. People continued to keep
him involved.
Task Oriented/Functional Organization
The company's quarterly appraisal process, required to be completed for all of the
properties under management, provided a good illustration of the way tasks were
completed. Property operating and market information came in from the development
partner managing the project. The asset manager compiled and analyzed the information
and made a first attempt at estimating property value. The asset manager's work would
go to his supervisor and, once approved, would then go to Production for its sign-off.
From Production, the valuation would then be forwarded to Portfolio Management, which
would have to sign-off. This process could occur several times before it reached
Executive Committee. Finally the Executive Committee would review the valuations and
could override what had made its way throughout the chain. One senior executive
commented: "So who owns the process? You could take almost any day to day
functional task in the old organization and, if you mapped it out, you would be horrified."
These impediments within the corporate structure became widely recognized as being a
serious problem to the effectiveness of the organization, and people began to openly talk
about the "gridlock" in the system. One junior employee spoke to the problem:
"It was very difficult to get anything done or approved because there were
so many delays in this company. If you wrote any type of report it would
go through five people who all have different styles of writing and
different thoughts on where real estate is going. So you would get it back,
you would make one revision, and then after you had revised it, then
somebody else would say 'I don't like what you just wrote, change it
again.' "
Information Technology (Management Information Systems)
Since the investor's were happy with the returns achieved by Copley's funds in the
1980's, there was neither an internal nor external need for a sophisticated information or
research system. Without such a need or pressure to create one, Copley's information
systems were relatively simple and focused on converting the development partner's
project statements to Copley's own reporting format for presentation to the investors.
Most of the information collected and assimilated by Copley was project oriented.
Although some computer systems were used, the data conversion and other reports were
typically generated by hand resulting in a very time consuming process. As reporting
pressures mounted, human error in the generation of these reports became of increasing
concern.
PRELUDE TO CHANGE
From 1988-1992, the decision had been taken to commit the company's primary
resources to problem-solving and workouts within the existing portfolios. Although
focused on putting-out fires, Copley initiated several half-hearted efforts at new business
initiatives. Every 18 to 24 months, O'Connor would gather the senior management team
for several days at off-site retreats to discuss current issues and long-range corporate
planning. Sessions at these retreats would include discussions surrounding new business
opportunities. Mandates would be given to senior executives to explore new initiatives
and they would return from the retreat both charged up to pursue these and eager to find
ways to turn the business around.
However, none of these initiatives were put into action. Copley's last new piece of
business dated back to the initial fund closing of their CIIF II fund in August, 1988. One
of the senior executives who had been asked to investigate new initiatives, indicated that
"in a perverse way, these new initiatives were almost predestined to fail." The failure
resulted from a combination of factors: lack of investor interest to invest in a devaluing
real estate market; executives forced to spend their energy on time consuming problems
and not new business initiatives; and an investment strategy that was rapidly becoming
outdated. As Coughlin recalled, "many of us felt that the company was not equipped to
respond to changing opportunities" in the market.
The break-down was seen by many in the company to have been a result of the functional
hierarchy and, during this time, the inward focus of the organization. While mini-task
forces were established to study a potential initiative, neither individuals nor any task
force were awarded a clear mandate across functional lines with authority to command
people's time and attention. Since the priorities and the reward system focused on putting
out fires, little was effectively accomplished. One senior executive said that "whenever
you had to cross functional lines, you were lost because you had lost control of the ability
to manage a project."
The company had difficulty coming to terms with the shift in the market away from a
formerly successful business strategy. Whereas the new business opportunities for
Copley consistently appeared to be in alternative directions, the ultimate commitment was
not made to break away from Copley's core business. Copley considered the core
business to be their "franchise value". They considered this "franchise value" to be the
value offered investors through its unique investment strategy. One senior executive
elaborated on the dilemma:
"We were worried about the image that would be sent to the marketplace.
What happens if you take the corners off your franchise and round them
off to accommodate different investment product types and initiatives. We
would have then become something less distinguished in the investment
community's eyes and it would be less clear to people as to what Copley
was. That was the debate and it went on for years."
Rather than leading to productive results, the attempts to investigate new businesses and
ensuing failure only increased frustration levels at the company. Reports would be
produced, reviewed and then shelved. Committees would drag on and never seem to end.
As O'Connor and Coughlin commented: "Some meetings and task forces were dubbed
'Sputnicks'. They were put up without anybody knowing how to get them back down."
One person commented, perhaps exaggerating: "One of the things that developed was a
very strong visceral emotional reaction to hearing the term 'task force.' " A sense of
skepticism developed throughout the company that task forces would never lead to
concrete changes. This perception further complicated the ability to receive cooperation
from the various functional groups.
CHANGE PROCESS OF 1993
By Fall 1992, O'Connor's frustration with Copley's stagnation was reaching a critical
stage. Opening a meeting with the Executive Committee, he made a strong statement:
"All four of us should be fired. We're not doing the job. We're not running this
company right."
To address the immediate need of new business generation, O'Connor brought in Steve
Wheeler, previously of John Hancock Realty and Morgan Stanley Realty, on a consulting
basis in April, 1993. O'Connor told Wheeler, "Steve, I need someone in here to be the
catalyst for saying things need to change, things need to be done differently." Wheeler
was hired full-time in August, 1993 as the Managing Director of Securitization. Coming
from outside the company and with a Wall Street background, Wheeler provided a new
set of skills and competencies. Because of his fresh perspective, Wheeler was described
as an "agent of change" by O'Connor and Coughlin.
Around the same time as Wheeler's full-time appointment, Copley hired T.A.B.
Associates (T.A.B). T.A.B. was a management consulting firm specializing in business
analyses, process improvements and organizational change. T.A.B. was hired to advise
Copley on organizational change and guide Copley through the change process. Rather
than analyzing the processes and systems of the company in a theoretical context, or in
the words of one employee, "in the ether", T.A.B.'s approach was to analyze employees
actual interaction and performance of their functions at Copley.
T.A.B. was able to provide a unique perspective often employed by O'Connor. He found
such a perspective "to be very helpful in the change process." Throughout the process,
O'Connor utilized T.A.B. as a "sounding board" when shaping his vision and facilitating
the change process.
Two groups were formed to work with T.A.B. in analyzing several processes within the
company: the Asset Management test group and the Business Plan test group. The groups
began by physically mapping out on a wall the precise manner in which these jobs were
performed. These were referred to as process maps. One of the group's senior manager
commented:
"Some process maps looked like a bowl of spaghetti. It was pretty
obvious that there was gridlock in the company because a lot of things
were flowing up to senior management - Joe O'Connor in particular. In
many cases, these were things he did not want to see. We started to relook
at the process. We felt we could change some things."
O'Connor provided his own thoughts on the gridlock revealed by the process mapping:
"When you took a look at one little box and you found out how
complicated it was, how many loop backs and redundant decisions there
were, we said, 'This ain't working the way it should be. Somehow we've
got to change it.' "
A member of the Asset Management team recalled her reaction upon viewing the process
map for the first time:
"You realized how screwed up the process was. So after being involved in
that, it opened up a lot of people's eyes. We said, 'What are we doing
here? Why are there so may delays in getting a real estate valuation from
asset management up a flight of stairs to a corner office so somebody can
sign off on it?' "
While these groups were identifying areas that needed to be changed within the company,
O'Connor was busy analyzing the company on a macro level. He compiled a list of 14
critical assumptions describing the real estate environment of both today and the
foreseeable future. A partial list reflecting several of these assumptions is provided
below. O'Connor considered this partial list to be the most critical and the most
applicable to Copley. A complete list is provided in Appendix B.
1. "Investors are customers and developer partners are suppliers.
2. Investors will demand more attention, servicing, control and autonomy.
3. Our core and non-core partners are changing. They are growing older, less
wealthy, less entrepreneurial and less willing to take risks. Many of the larger
partners have redefined their role from development and entrepreneurial
organizations to that of management/service organizations.
4. Securitization is rapidly changing and here to stay.
5. Copley has a set of unique people, skills and relationships that give us a strong
competitive edge in a narrow segment of the market."
From this list of assumptions, O'Connor identified three specific objectives for Copley to
achieve in order to successfully operate in the future:
1. Form a new business group that is forward looking.
2. Redefine the role of Copley's partners, and have them understand that
role.
3. Acquire the skills to enter into the securitized market.
In order to achieve these objectives, O'Connor recognized the need to redefine Copley's
customer. The developer partners became the supplier and the pension funds became the
customer. In the 1980's, quality developers were scarce, while sources of capital were in
abundant supply. In the 1990's, these roles completely reversed. O'Connor summarized
this reversal in the following, "Our clients are our money providers, our pension funds,
our investors."
These dramatic objectives were to be initiated in a company environment that O'Connor
characterized as one "that was finding it harder to make decisions rather than easier" and
"that did not have unlimited resources anymore."
He then identified the following steps as a means to achieve those objectives:
1. "Promote significant internal efficiencies which will provide faster, better
decision making and improved customer service.
2. Use these efficiencies to provide significant additional resources for increased
emphasis and investment in New Products and Services, and Information and
Research.
3. Foster a new spirit and dedication to moving the company forward to take
advantage of market opportunities."
Upon completing his evaluation, O'Connor consulted TAB regarding the most
appropriate and effective manner to deliver his perceptions and objectives to the
employees. T.A.B.'s suggestion was for O'Connor to present his thoughts to a core group
of Copley employees and let them "digest and draw their own conclusions rather than
parachute in the conclusions." O'Connor assembled 18 members of Senior Management
at an off-site meeting on October 12, 1993 to deliver his message. Within Copley, Senior
Managers were considered to be anyone with a title of Vice President or higher. T.A.B.
was in attendance at this meeting to both design the workshop and act as facilitators.
O'Connor told the assembled group: "It's time to change. If we don't change, I don't
think I want to run this company. I don't think I want to be around."
Coughlin recalled O'Connor's message to the people in attendance:
"Joe broadly broke the world down to two decades, the 1980's and the
1990's. He said, 'this is what the 1980's looked like and this is what the
1990's look like. I have to tell you, we are a 1980's company. We are not
a 1990's company. I want to take this company into the 1990's in a big
way. Before I can do that I need a commitment from you. Are you with
me? Are you willing to go through what will be a painful process in
change? If you are not with me or disagree with what I am doing, this is
the time to speak up or forever hold your piece.' "
To stress the dire position of the company should Copley not enact dramatic changes,
O'Connor told those in attendance, "I don't see half of you being here in four months..."
Then, he gave the group 24 hours to voice their own thoughts and observations on the
need for change at Copley and to discuss their vision of the future. O'Connor then left the
room to allow everyone to speak freely.
After O'Connor left, the group then engaged in a brainstorming session described as a
"group grope" by one participant. The discussion first centered on whether they agreed
with O'Connor's perception of the real estate market. Conversations then arose on a
myriad of topics and a number of questions were raised. One topic focused on the group's
desire to work in a markedly different organization than that to which they were
accustomed. Some people questioned if they would have the qualifications to remain
with the firm. Others discussed if change were to occur, where would it occur - at the top
or the bottom? Yet another debated the breadth and depth of change: "Does change
question every aspect of the company, or can just a few issues be examined?"
Other issues arose regarding the vision and values of Copley. What were they?
What did people want them to be? What was Copley?
In these early stages of the change process, two primary teams were formed:
1. The Delta Group
2. Organizational Action Team
These groups will be discussed below.
The Delta Group (Delta)
At the suggestion of T.A.B., the group elected five people to both examine the role and
responsibilities of a Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") for the company and determine a
CEO's level of involvement in this review process. In addition, the group was to further
discuss and shape answers to questions on Copley's vision and values. This elected group
of five people became known as The Delta Group.
The next day O'Connor returned to the group and was informed of the results. Delta
invited O'Connor to become a member of Delta. In addition, O'Connor asked Jack
Phillips, Managing Director of Client Relations, to become a member of the team and to
act as a facilitator in future Delta meetings. Delta believed Phillips had the proper level of
experience and authority to manage the Delta team members.
In order to generate diverse opinions, the group in attendance at the meeting requested
both Delta and O'Connor to independently prepare reviews of the CEO's role and
responsibilities.
Delta's review concluded the CEO should be involved in such issues as corporate
strategy, managing the relationship with the parent company and assisting with new
business initiatives and administrative duties. With the exception of managing significant
relationships such as Copley's largest lender, Wells Fargo Bank, the CEO should not be
involved in the existing asset base. Delta also determined the CEO should not be involved
in the hiring and firing of employees unless those employees reported directly to his
office.
Although similar in almost all respects to Delta's report, O'Connor's report, however,
revealed a fundamental misunderstanding in the definition of the CEO's role. Although
O'Connor agreed with those responsibilities Delta identified as outside the CEO's
domain, he contended that those responsibilities had not been his for quite some time. In
addition, he had delegated many of those tasks to subordinates. In practice, however,
employees used O'Connor as an excuse when forced to make difficult decisions, claiming
that the responsibility was not theirs, but O'Connor's. Utilizing the two reviews as the
framework, Delta and O'Connor jointly agreed on O'Connor retaining the position as
CEO in the role and with the responsibilities agreed upon in the reports.
The misunderstanding revealed in the reports prompted Delta to further evaluate the
organization. Delta wanted to expand their review to include the roles, responsibilities
and characteristics required of the leadership beyond the position of CEO. However, the
Delta team believed even this expanded review was still not broad enough. One Delta
team member recalled the impression shared by members of Delta Team:
"We're bumping up against something big here. It's not just the
leadership of the company. It's what the company should look like, what
it should be, and we think that we need to expand the scope of review. It
may not be Delta Group, but somebody ought to be taking Copley through
more analysis."
According to one Senior Manager, hard feelings developed among the fourteen Senior
Managers not invited to attend the October 12th meeting. In order to build a broad
consensus, the need was recognized for all thirty-two Senior Managers to become
involved and committed to this review and imminent changes. To build a consensus,
Delta reported its findings to all the Senior Management and requested their commitment
and agreement to proceed. Senior Management agreed that Copley should move forward
on a full scale review as recommended by Delta. In addition, Delta was awarded
responsibility to initiate the comprehensive review. From Delta's review, the change
process was initially identified, structured and implemented.
Establishment of Other Groups
Once the decision was made for Delta to review other aspects of the company, Delta
determined it had neither the time nor the expertise needed to handle the change process
by itself. After all, Delta was comprised of "Deal Junkies", not "managers." Further,
Delta members realized the process would require an incredible amount of time on top of
each members already busy schedules. One Delta member recounted that it was a 100%
commitment in addition to having a full time job. Therefore, Delta decided to create
other groups to complete the evaluation of the company. Each new group had narrowly
defined objectives and reported back to Delta. In this capacity, Delta acted as a "holding
company" which steered and guided the other groups through the process. It also was the
reporting body back to Senior Management. As opposed to the endless task forces and
committees of previous years, these groups were established with a finite life and were
disbanded upon achieving their objectives.
Delta selected all the members of the new groups. In these selections, Delta tried to
incorporate relevant areas of the company and to choose individuals who would make
positive contributions. Once an employee was selected, his or her participation was
mandatory. One member of several teams said, "You just couldn't sit and attend the
meeting. You had to be an active participating member."
Each of the new groups included at least one member of Delta. That person would act as
the conduit between the two groups. Each group produced mission statements and issued
in depth reports on their findings.
Organizational Action Team (OAT)
Formed on October 29, 1993, Organizational Action Team (OAT) was the first group
formed by Delta. OAT's mission statement was to "deliver a recommendation for a new
organizational structure, including skills, roles, and responsibilities for the major
processes, and make a recommendation that will be consistent with Copley's Vision,
Values and Strategy."
Processes was the key component of the mission statement for OAT. Previously, Copley
had been organized along functional lines. These functions were defined as specific tasks
performed by individuals to complete the general business objective. Examples of
functions were Portfolio Management, Asset Management, Management Information
Systems, and Accounting/Finance. In contrast, an organization built around processes
focused on specific operations. A fund or a particular business initiative driven by teams
are examples of organizing around processes. In a process, the teams are created and
operated only for the life of the process. The teams and that particular process then are
disbanded upon the expiration of the fund or the failure of the business initiative.
OAT consisted of six people, all members of Senior Management. It was charged with
five key obligations, which Copley referred to as "Deliverables":
1. Recommendation of a new organizational structure and supporting
rationale.
2. Roles and responsibilities for the major future processes.
3. Core competencies and skill sets for owners of major future processes.
4. A process for determining how to select the owners of the major future
processes.
5. A transition plan to describe the process for getting to the new
organizational structure.
OAT determined Copley should be organized into four "blocks" consisting of the major
processes: Corporate Management, Investment and Management Services, Information
and Research, and New Business. They also determined that these blocks should be
headed by one person, referred to as a "Blockhead" or a "Process Owner" and that the
blocks should consist of teams, headed by Team Leaders. OAT only chose the structure,
it did not choose the individuals that would fill the structure. (Each of the four blocks and
their roles are explained in detail later in this case.)
The demands of OAT were even more time-consuming than Delta. A member of Delta
attributed this to the dense set of issues OAT was asked to consider. OAT included two
members of Delta, one of which was a member of the Executive Committee and a charter
member of Copley. Involvement of such high level managers reflected the company's
commitment to the change process.
Strategy Team (ST)
Formed at the beginning of November, 1993, The Strategy Team (ST) was the second
group formed by Delta. Determining Copley's new business strategy was a key
component to fulfilling OAT's mission. However, OAT quickly realized that the task was
too large and too complex for the OAT members to address in light of their hefty agenda
and traditional business responsibilities. OAT asked Delta for help. In response, Delta
created and assigned members to ST. ST consisted exclusively of six members of Senior
Management. Of the six members, two were also Delta members and O'Connor.
ST's Mission Statement read as follows: "This team is to report to the Delta Group with a
proposed Copley Corporate Strategy, consistent with the Visions and Values (as they
change) articulated by the Senior Management." ST first wrote the new Copley strategy:
"Copley offers a diversified array of real estate products and services in
the most profitable segments of the market which meet its client's
changing investment needs. The products and services are built on our
strengths and provide Copley with incentives that are closely coupled with
its client's interests."
ST then outlined Copley's strengths and weaknesses, described the real estate
environment in terms of Customer Perspective, Capital/Real estate Markets,
Demographics and Globalization, identified potential future clients, outlined services that
could be provided to those clients, and developed short, intermediate and long term
product initiatives. ST accomplished this dense agenda in a short period of time was
disbanded within three weeks of its creation.
As a result, its team members logged many hours. One member, who was also involved
with Delta, estimated that the two teams combined exacted about 90 hours per week from
his schedule.
Gridlock Team (GT)
The Gridlock Team (GT) was also formed in early November, 1993. Delta determined
there existed issues needing immediate attention. GT consisted of eight members and was
the only team reporting to Delta that included members below the level of Senior
Management.
GT's mission statement was "To identify and make recommendations for the
implementation of simple, quick, measurable solutions to decision making and
administrative 'gridlock' in Copley; and in doing so, identify some of the larger issues
that must be fixed." It had three goals to accomplish:
1. Identify approximately 10 simple fixes that can be implemented quickly
which will save time and resources as well as reduce the time that is
required to get key decisions made.
2. Identify major hard-to-fix issues that affect organizational gridlock and
prioritize in order of importance.
3. Identify a list of major cultural issues which create gridlock.
GT first interviewed Copley employees to gain a better understanding of what was meant
by "gridlock". They found five categories of gridlock, which are listed below with an
accompanying quote:
1. Authority of decision making was unclear and not widely distributed.
"I don't have the power or know who does."
2. Priorities were not identified or communicated well, and changed
frequently.
"I don't have clear consistent direction on what is important."
3. Resources were not allocated appropriately, and professional staff was
overextended.
"I can't do a good job on ten things at once."
4. Internal support systems were insufficient.
"I don't have the tools."
5. Cultural norms impeded efficiency.
"I am distracted by unnecessary paper shuffling and politics."
To address its first goal of identifying quick fixes, GT categorized issues using the
acronym SCRAP-M: Staffing, Communication, Reports, Approvals, Procedures and
Meetings. It then identified aspects within these categories that had a high payoff, yet
were easy to fix. Each issue identified was addressed by creating a defining Problem
Statement, a recommendation, and an action plan, which included the personnel assigned
to the task, a deadline and the anticipated impact.
GT conducted a similar analysis to address its second goal of identifying hard to fix
issues. GT created three "levels" of high priority: Certain Death issues, which needed to
be addressed immediately; Must Solve Within Six Months issues, which were not
immediately life-threatening, but needed to be addressed shortly; and Serious
Consideration issues, which needed to be addressed as necessary. GT identified five
issues that fell in the first category, two in the second category, and three in the third
category. A summary statement was written to describe each issue. These were then
forwarded to Delta and OAT to address and incorporate within their process and
structural design.
To address the third goal of identifying major cultural issues which created gridlock, GT
identified thirteen values needing improvement in order to reduce gridlock. Each value
had one or two "catch phrases" associated with it to help better define its context.
Gridlock then created a matrix determining the interrelationships between the hard to
achieve gridlock issues on one axis and the cultural issues on the other axis
Like ST, GT completed much work in a short period of time. It was disbanded at the end
of November, 1993.
Vision & Values Team (VV)
In mid November, 1993, the Vision & Values Team (VV) was created by Delta to further
refine Delta's review of Copley's new vision and values statements. The vision and value
statements created by this group appear in Appendix C. The VV team also existed for
only a brief period of time and was disbanded in mid December, 1993.
Core Business Selection Group (CBSG)
Formed in late November, 1993, the Core Business Selection Group (CBSG) was created
by Delta to select the personnel for the positions in OAT's new organizational structure
for Copley. The selection primarily entailed choosing people as Blockheads and Team
Leaders. CBSG evaluated the skill sets and the capabilities of Senior Management to
determine the individuals best-suited for the available positions. As a point of fact, CBSG
chose three of its four members to become Blockheads. CBSG was disbanded in the third
week of December, 1993 upon completion of its assignment.
The Unveiling
On December 21, 1993, the entire company attended a Quarterly Staff Meeting. At this
meeting, the new corporate structure, Blockheads and Team Leaders were announced and
presented to the company. Two days after this meeting Delta and OAT were both
disbanded now that their assignments had been completed. However, Delta's last official
act was to create a new group called the Transition Team.
The Transition Team (TT)
The Transition Team (Transition) was empowered to pursue and implement the
organizational structure formulated by OAT. In order to accomplish this, TT had to
coordinate the movement of personnel and structure the "old" Copley to the "new"
Copley. Meeting for the first time on January 4, 1994, TT consisted of nine team
members. All but one of the members were from Senior Management and four members
were Blockheads.
Since Delta was no longer in existence, TT operated without any further guidance. This
created problems. The other teams benefited not only from a strict reporting process back
to Delta, but also from narrowly defined goals and agendas. According to one member of
TT, the group never "got its act together" and never seemed to have a strong, focused
effort. Another team member commented: "I think we had people coming to the party
who were hung-over from the last party". The participants were "too tired, too immersed"
in the change process. The members of TT felt conflicting pressure to hurry the process
along to maintain the corporate-wide support, while, at the same time, to proceed slowly
in order to be thorough.
Although the plans for the transition had been completed since March, 1994, TT was still
meeting as of late April, 1994. Because of the difficulty in setting a specific date to mark
the official end of transitioning, TT was still in existence as a source of guidance to
people even after the official date of transition.
Like the other teams, Transition required a huge time commitment from its members.
One member estimated that it alone accounted for up to 50 hours per week of his time.
Hands-UP
After OAT had identified the structure and CBSG had identified the Blockheads and
Team Leaders, the next step was to match the unassigned people with the available
positions on the teams and other areas of the company. This process was called "Hands-
Up". Pamela Herbst conducted an assessment of the unassigned personnel in the
company. Each person was evaluated by subordinates, superiors and peers to determine
his or her skill set. A file for each person was created consisting of the evaluations, past
reviews, resumes, past performance and skill assessment forms. The files were compiled
by January 31, 1994.
During this period, the Blockheads and Team leaders completed their budgets and
personnel requirements for each block and team. Once the allocation of jobs in each of
the blocks and teams were determined, the unassigned personnel reviewed a list of the
available positions and required skill sets within each Block and Team. A job fare was
organized to provide people with more information on both the available positions and
the teams. At the job fare, the Team Leaders distributed information packages on their
respective teams and goals.
On February 10, 1994, each employee submitted to Herbst a list, ranked in order of
preference, of their top five choices. After sorting the applicants by Blocks, Herbst
generated a list of employees applying for each position within a Block or Team.
Beginning February 17th, each Team Leader reviewed the files of personnel applying for
a position within their Team or Block. The Team Leaders then selected people to fill the
open positions. In the event two or more Team Leaders chose the same person to be
within their team, then that person would be assigned to the position ranked higher on
his/her list of preferences.
The selection process was completed over a two week period and the new teams were
announced on March 1st. According to a member of Senior Management, the selection
process was "Fairly painless and worked out very well. I would say 80% of the people got
their first or second choice of job." In summarizing the entire "Hands Up" process,
another Senior Manager said, "The amazing thing is as soon as we announced the
changes, the whole climate in the company changed immediately people had a renewed
sense of security".
Only a few persons were not reassigned upon the completion of the "Hands-Up" process.
The majority of these positions were in the legal department. However, every person in
the legal department received an offer from of employment from the law firm newly
designated to handle Copley's future legal work. In the restructured organization, all legal
functions were to be out-sourced. However, nineteen (19) new jobs, mostly requiring new
skill sets, were created as a result of the reorganization.
Information Transfer
During the period between late March and mid April, employees transitioned from old to
new positions. Because the focus of the organization had shifted from the asset to the
fund, skills and knowledge were not directly transferable. For instance, an employee may
have been an expert on industrial properties in the Southwest in the old organization, but
those properties may have been in several different funds. That person became
responsible for educating the newly created teams on those assets and the specific
markets. Likewise, that person was required to learn as much as possible about their own
team's properties and specific markets. Those assets could be located in several markets
around the country. Any or all of which could be foreign to the employee. Since they all
relied on each other to be brought up to speed, this process required the significant effort
and cooperation of all employees.
Office Layout
To create a more efficient working environment and to promote team efficiencies, Copley
reoriented the office layout to allow team members to be physically located in close
proximity to one another. The move took place over April 16-18, 1994.
"Broke The China"
The change process required the review and questioning of all the old structures, values
and focuses for modification or deletion. This review was painful for those who
contributed to the evolution of Copley over the years. The senior managers of Copley
were proud of the entity that had been created from their work and effort. Now this entity
was considered inefficient and outdated. As one individual observed:
"We took a lot of things we thought were sacrosanct and broke the
china. We took all the rules we were living by and examined them and
reexamined them. We came to the conclusion some were right and
some were not right. I spent most of my business career here. It was
taking some of the things I was a contributor to and say they were
wrong. It takes a high degree of self-assessment and say its wrong and
not feel like I have been a total failure. You need to get past the
personal and realize it may have been right at a given point in time.
Maybe it was right in the 1980's to do things in this way. But the
market has changed and you can't hold onto it just out of a proprietary
sense."'
Fear Of The Unknown
Everyone was were concerned about the effects of the change process and company
realignment on their futures and positions. One senior manager offered: "You could walk
along and feel the tension, literally feel the tension." A Team Member commented: "One
thing I don't think they took into account was the human emotion side of it. These were
major changes in someone's life." Another senior manager commented:
"I just have a really hard time putting people through uncertainty. The
uncertainty is tough. Especially when it is permeating throughout the
entire company - even star performers. I don't know if there is a right or
wrong way...I think the intent was admirable. I just don't know if I would
have done it that way."
To avoid this uncertainty, one individual thought an alternative approach to the change
process would have been...
"...to do it really quietly. I honestly think you are better off to have a small
group of people, swear them to confidentiality...and quickly figure it
out...Rather than drag it out. Two months may not seem like a long time,
but, to a lot of people, it seemed like an eternity."
THE NEW ORGANIZATION:
STRUCTURE.
The new organization was structured pursuant to external and internal goals. The
overriding external goal was defined as "meeting the needs of our customers." The
internal goal was to at least maintain the existing level of business, but expand revenue
through new business efforts. To best achieve these goals, the organization was structured
along process lines as opposed to the previous functional lines. The new organization was
divided into four processes, referred to as blocks:
1. Investment Management & Services
2. New Business
3. Information & Research
4. Corporate Management
The new organizational structure is provided in Appendix D. Each block was headed by
an individual referred to as a "Blockhead" or "Process Owner" with responsibility for the
implementation of the process within the block. The blocks consisted of teams with a
Team Leader and Team Members. Each team was organized around a particular process
such as a fund or a business initiative. The teams provided the basic working unit within
each block. The teams were directed by Team Leaders who established strategy and
direction for their respective teams. Each team member contributed a unique skill set or
knowledge to the team.
Investment Management & Services
Investment Management & Services housed the existing Copley portfolio and consisted
of the former functions of Asset Management and Portfolio Management. In Copley's
former alignment, the company was organized around geographic regions, in order to
service the development partner. With Copley's customer realignment around the capital
source or investor, teams were set up around each of the funds. For instance, one team
name was Developmental Properties Account (DPA), while another was Copley
Institutional Investment Fund (CIIF). Each team was responsible for its own asset
management, portfolio management, accounting, property sales and client relations. This
block was by far the largest with over 100 employees and, as of April, 1994, was the only
block bringing revenue into the company through asset management fees.
New Business
New Business was a newly created unit with the directive of generating fresh revenue
sources for the firm through new investment vehicles or investor services. Steve Wheeler
was named to lead this group. As an indication of the perceived importance of New
Business to the future viability of the company, this group was slated to contain 25
members. Of this number, 17 employees were reassigned from other areas of the
company. The remaining 8 members of this unit were to be new hires.
Teams in New Business were organized around the business initiatives. This created two
qualities that were unique to the teams in this unit. One, they were much more ephemeral
than the teams in other blocks. Upon completion of a transaction, they were to be
disbanded. Second, Team Members worked on more than one team at any given time.
For instance, Wheeler, in addition to being the Blockhead, was also a Team Leader on a
specific initiative.
New Business was already making progress even before the transition was complete.
Although it had not yet completed any transactions, this unit was working on ten potential
initiatives as of April, 1994. Wheeler estimated that it would take approximately 60 to 90
days to create product relating to the existing portfolios, while "green field" projects
would take six months or longer.
There was an entrepreneurial spirit among the group's members. One member of the
block commented:
"New Business is all about coming up with new ideas. It's taking an idea
and running it through the entire process: can we get it done, does it make
money, what does it involve, do we have the personnel, are we qualified to
do it? It's an evolving role, too. Where we are today, we may not be in
six months. It allows you to come up with different ideas, new businesses,
things that we haven't been involved in before. It could be mortgaged-
backed securities, it could be REITs..."
Information & Research
The Management Information Systems, one of the ten functions in the old organizational
structure, was expanded and elevated within the new organizational structural to form one
of the four main business units - the Information & Research block. The group became
responsible for the processing and dissemination of information of all kinds, both
internally and externally. Through systems established by this group, Copley hoped to
increase their capacity to generate various types of research ranging from regional real
estate markets and regional economies to real estate related capital markets. The
expanded and more accessible data base would be utilized to facilitate investment
decisions, create new products and provide better information as a service to clients.
Copley recognized the growing demand for information by real estate owners, lenders,
potential investors and other industry players. In the future, these entities would demand
and expect concrete information on markets and economies.
With information becoming of increasing importance to the company, its clients, and the
industry as a whole, this unit became a critical component of the business going forward.
This group was the result of Copley's conscious decision to make the collection, analysis
and delivery of information and research a major building block of the company's overall
strategy. As a further indication of Copley's commitment to Information and Research,
this block was staffed with 15 people.
The creation of the Information & Research block was widely viewed within the company
as a significant competitive advantage to Copley. Phillips recalled the formulation of the
concept:
"Senior management knew that we had a lot of pockets of information that
did not talk to each other. And so we ultimately concluded that, just for
survival's sake, we really had to make information technology and
research - and research wasn't there in the beginning, but it got added in
because we felt the two as being very integral - into a core competency and
then we said, 'Well, why not make it a competitive advantage?'
It became evident early on in the process that Copley did not have the person with the
background and capabilities to head this group. OAT determined this individual should
be responsible and accountable for "meeting the information needs of both internal and
external clients and insure that the process gathers, synthesizes and delivers information
needed in the organization."
Copley management was in agreement on what they were not looking for in an individual
for this position. Neither: "a high-powered, Ph.D., academic, abstract thinker about real
estate" nor "the guy that set up the Saber System for American Airlines." One individual
felt the person should have three main competencies: technology, management and
strategic leadership. The level of real estate knowledge required for this position was a
source of debate among the senior managers. One individual commented, "Maybe some
real estate knowledge, but real estate being the least important. There's plenty of real
estate expertise in this company." In addition, this person should not have "real estate
blinders on, but really have a more cross-industry perspective. An individual who won't
be mired about the way we thought about things in the past." Some felt this individual
needed to be a leader, visionary and be able to generate enthusiasm. As one person
commented: "This person has to be a real leader, and somebody who has a vision and is
really able to get people fired up about moving toward that." Finally, others felt a fresh
perspective, provided by an outside hire, was a healthy contribution
To find the proper individual for this position, Phillips was placed in charge of the search.
In addition, he was appointed the interim head of the Information & Research block.
Phillips was placed in the position to give the group cohesiveness and a voice at the
Management Committee. As of April, 1994, the position was not yet filled and Phillips
estimated that the process would take another six to eight months.
While the general purpose of the block had been established, its specific role and the
means to achieve its goals was to be determined by the permanent blockhead. This
person's absence lead to a plethora of opinions among Copley personnel as to the specific
purpose of the block. For instance, O'Connor described Copley as an aircraft carrier,
with Information & Research as a "combat information center":
"They've got all the radar screens, and they're trying to look ahead out in
the field, and say 'What's out there? What are the problems we anticipate
from investment policy? What information do you need in order to do your
part of the job right? How do I make sure that the information is
coordinated between the different groups?' "
A senior manager provided his vision for the Information and Research Block:
"I see the day when marketing people go out with their lap tops and all the
information for their entire portfolio is in there. People will be asking
questions and these people will be on line to answer. I can also see the
time when the client has the terminal in their office and they have all the
information on-line, real-time from Copley's portfolio data base."
Another senior manager indicated what he saw as being the importance of the information
and research effort to the future of the company:
"This takes what was a year ago a necessary evil and actually use it to
grow the business and use our knowledge of information and our ability to
collect it and then disseminate it and make it available, not just to our
internal users, but also to clients...Perhaps someday I would expect to
develop products around it. There's clearly a bit of blue sky involved
there, but that's essentially what we're trying to do."
One member of the New Business block simply said, "I don't know what they are going
to provide going forward, to be honest with you." And there was even skepticism among
employees in the Information and Research block regarding the level of commitment
from the Management Committee to make this a core business unit. One person
commented:
"It was presented to me that we've been elevated in the company to be
seen as a very integral part, whereas before we felt we were just servicing
these people. I'm not convinced that we're really on the top of
everybody's list."
Corporate Management
The final core business unit, Corporate Management, was headed by O'Connor and was
responsible for the continuous development of Copley's corporate strategy, policy and
business plans. In addition, this group directed other corporate management functions
including the general counsel, controller, payroll, human resource development, public
relations and corporate administration. There were approximately 25 employees assigned
within the block.
Management Committee
Above the four blocks sat the Management Committee. The committee consisted of the
four Blockheads or Process Owner of each block and an Outside Advisor, with O'Connor
in the dual role as Blockhead and CEO. The Management Committee was responsible
for strategy, new product authorization, reinvention, and macro-investment policy. In
addition, this group provided one of the communication links between the blocks.
Synergy
The New Business and Information and Research blocks were identified as the groups
that would distinguish Copley going forward. It was envisioned that these two blocks
would work closely together in exploring opportunities in the marketplace. As evidence
of its commitment to these ventures, Copley increased the budget for these two blocks
from a total of $1.5 million to $5.1 million. In addition, the New Business block did not
have the sole mandate to explore new sources of business. The Investment Management
& Services block considered themselves well positioned with their knowledge of the
existing inventory to assist and even create new business initiatives. Therefore, New
Business, Information & Research and Investment Management & Services were hoped
to generate additional revenue sources.
ROLES
Teams
As each block was organized around a process, the blocks consisted of teams to perform
the process. By realigning in a team orientation, the company was thought to be able to
provide better service to its customers. Copley defined the team as "a set of individuals
who work together to achieve an overall result and who rely on one another to attain the
optimum of success and goal achievement." For instance, each portfolio within
Investment Management & Services had a team dedicated to the management of that
particular portfolio. The basic tasks of the team within each block, as identified by
Copley, were as follows:
" Set goals;
e Solve problems;
" Make decisions;
" Ensure follow-through and completion of tasks;
" Collaborate on work;
" Establish lines of open communication;
" Establish an environment which encourages issues to be raised and
discussed;
" Ensure an appropriate support system.
Team Members were assigned based upon their skill set and knowledge and the focus of
the team. The company realized certain skill sets were not needed in the everyday
performance of the team, but may be required in the overall discharge of the team's
responsibilities. As a result, Experts, offering specialized skill sets, were assigned to each
block. As one manager explained, the Experts looked...
"...across the various portfolios. They are supposed to provide the three
C's - consistency, control and contact. Consistency across the teams;
Control where it is needed like accounting; Contact where we have major
clients, partners, lenders."
The teams utilized these Experts to assist them on an as needed basis. For instance,
Investment Management and Services had four experts: Asset Disposition, Client
Relations, Internal Controller and Finance. The Expert was not be the only contact: "For
us to lose relationships because we empowered a team ...is ludicrous." Therefore, the
Stakeholders provided additional continuity for the client and assisted "in seeing the big
picture and what's good for the company as a whole."
Stakeholders
Anyone within the firm enjoying a significant personal relationship with a capital source
was identified as a Stakeholder. Stakeholders were responsible for maintaining a single
point of contact with significant relationships of the company. The role of Stakeholder
was not a full-time position. This role was in addition to the individual's other
responsibilities as a Blockhead, Team Leader or Team Member. Under the new
alignment, organized by portfolio, an investor may prefer to interact with one particular
individual within the company rather than a new point of contact resulting from the
realignment of responsibilities. Stakeholders were created to work through this
inefficiency. O'Connor saw the need for this role: "If a customer wants one person to
deal with, they'll get one person."
Empowerment
To better serve the client, the new structure empowered teams to make all major and
minor decisions relating to their process. For example, specific portfolio teams in the
Investment Management & Services block were empowered to determine the strategy and
execute the plan for their respective portfolios. As one senior manager commented: "The
teams were empowered to establish the strategy for the portfolio as well as make
decisions necessary to implement that strategy." In addition, these teams had direct
contact with the investors in their fund. As such, the teams were given responsibility for
strategy, budgeting, communication, reporting, management and operation of their
processes.
A senior manager defined empowering people and teams as:
"Providing some parameters...giving a sense of direction from the top, be
that the Process Owner or the Management Committee, about what really
matters. Then throw the ball to the team leader and his or her team to
really develop a plan for implementation. Then, the team leaders would
go to the Process Owner on a regular basis as a reality check. The
Management Committee would act as a Board of Directors rather than an
authoritarian body."
A long-standing complaint at Copley was the previous lack of decision-making authority
by anyone other than a few of the highest ranking officers. Almost all decisions had to be
forwarded through a lengthy chain of command. An employee described the old format:
"You were definitely constrained by who to go to, who to get final approval from, or day
to day things that you should have been able to go to one person and say, 'This is what I
want to do.' "
In contrast, empowerment would allow the decision-making authority to be shifted to the
people actually responsible for the process. In this way, the people most familiar with the
issues would be the ones making the decisions. One individual commented: "What the
new process allows is for that decision to be made by one individual. I don't have to
worry about numerous people being involved. It's a major improvement, more than
anything else."
Titles
To promote unity and empowerment, titles were specifically de-emphasized in the new
team format. The titles Blockhead, Team Leader and Team Member were seen as
temporary and the Corporate Management was examining the title system - with some
difficulty. A Team Leader in the Corporate Management Group commented:
Going forward in the new organization, we will try to keep it simple. A
couple of issues come up. If we're in a team environment, then maybe we
should not have titles. From outside feedback, that is fine if you are a
startup company, but when you are an existing entity, it is hard to tell
people you do not have a title anymore, when they have had titles. It is
also different in dealing with the outside world when you do not have a
title. People will ask, 'Are you authorized to deal with me?' So, for the
purposes of titles, we are going to have to define them somewhat.
O'Connor's New Role
One of the most significant changes made was the role O'Connor would play in the
organization going forward. In the new organization, O'Connor's role as a Process Owner
of Corporate Management and CEO did not embody the same level of power or control
that he exercised under the previous structure. With the team format and empowerment in
the new organization, other people began making decisions previously made by
O'Connor.
O'Connor viewed his new role in general terms as very similar to his role in the early
years of Copley: "I was a pretty good coach and teacher." More specifically, he viewed
his role as Process Owner and CEO in the new organization as ...
"...50% sales, contacts and relationships to create business. The remaining
50% focused on vision, strategy formation, identifying organizational
problems and remedies and determining the continual changes needed by
Copley to meet the demands of the marketplace."
SKILLS
Skill Sets
With the implementation of the team format and empowerment, two general skill sets
were identified as being necessary. The first skill set was easily transferable to the new
organizational structure and consisted of the same functional skills possessed under the
old organization -- i.e., asset management, accounting, finance, etc. These were the skills
necessary to carry on Copley's basic operation as a real estate investment company.
The second skill set consisted of team skills or interrelationship skills necessary to
effectively operate Copley as a company under the new structure. This skill set was
noticeably absent in the old Copley environment. As one observer commented: "There is
also a need for team skills or interrelationship skills that I am not sure that as a company
we have ever tried to find or reinforce." In the new organization, people "will end up
being not as much a specialist with skills skewed in one direction or another, but will
develop broad skills or interdisciplinary skills. People will share these in varying ways
and teams will come together where they will augment one another in a much more
dramatic way than we have seen in the past." Coughlin observed how he felt his role had
changed with the new organization:
"My role previously as head of asset and portfolio management was as
senior person in those areas directing in a hierarchical way the goals and
objectives of those areas, causing them to be broken down into subparts
and be effectively completed in the organization. My role today is to
coach and counsel and to motivate people in those areas to accomplish the
same things. It is to give people the tools and the resources to get the job
done."
New Leadership Skills
Senior management realized a need for new leadership skills. Visioning was a new skill
developed among the senior managers. In the new organization, visioning was defined as
looking forward strategically and being able to anticipate needed resources and potential
problems. Senior managers developed or broadened skills to motivate both individuals
and teams. Instead of a need for technical skills, senior managers needed the skills to
manage both individuals and teams. One senior manager observed:
"The skills of the leader today include the ability to assess individuals
collectively and individually. Their ability to work together means
something, but their own strengths and weaknesses individually need to be
measured so that you can see them balance someone else on the team."
Training
The development of new management and team skills was facilitated through training. As
one observer commented: "Before you might have had training in asset management or
finance. Today, the training must be on more of what I call the soft side of the business -
the management skills." Another commented: "We need a lot of help in team training,
because we are not used to operating as a team."
On March 23, 1994 Copley held its quarterly meeting. The day was dubbed "Team Day"
because it was the formal introduction to the company of Manus Associates, a Team
Management Consulting firm. The employees sat according to their teams. The consultant
asked them to discuss their perceived opportunities and drawbacks to working in a team
format. He then introduced four building blocks of effective teams: Goals, Roles,
Processes and Relationships.
Team Day represented the first formal effort at training employees in the new
organization. Additional training in teamwork and other areas were envisioned.
Additional training would be in the form of seminars and workshops to be attended by
everyone in the company. As of April, 1994, Corporate Management was still compiling
a plan and schedule for training.
SYSTEMS
Reward Systems
Along with a new organizational structure, some reward systems, such as compensation
and titles, were changed in order to facilitate the new team focus and empowerment. As
of April, 1994, many of these systems were still being identified and studied for
resolution.
Compensation was identified as a major and necessary change. The Team Members in
each block were to be compensated under a new format based upon both individual
efforts and the efforts and results of their respective teams. The Corporate Management
Team Leader charged with responsibility for structuring the new system commented: "We
realize in order for people to be incentivized to meet team goals a portion of their
compensation must be tied to meeting team objectives. We are trying to figure that out
now."1
One component of compensation that had been determined was the bonus for the first six
months of 1994. It was to be in large part based on how effectively employees
transitioned from their old position to their new position. According to Coughlin,
"If someone has done a good job getting the materials prepared, effectively
transitioning to another person and effectively integrating themselves into
a new team, then they will get a good bonus. Someone who has not done
that may not get a bonus. So we are trying...to tie compensation on the
effective activities of the transition to give people that incentive."
In the new team format, traditional functional titles, such as Vice President or Asset
Manager, were de-emphasized to facilitate team effort and process orientation. As of
April, 1994, this issue was still under study. However, the typical human concerns
regarding promotion and the need for titles as recognition of status outside the company
were being taken into consideration in modifying this system. As one individual
commented: "Not too many people outside Copley know what a Process Owner is or
what their level is in the company."
REFLECTIONS ON THE CHANGE
One interviewee indicated, "success breeds failure" from lack of change or complacency.
Although the company had realized success in the past, the future was clouded. Everyone
in the company realized something needed to be done.
Another observer commented, "This company needed an enema." On the changes
enacted, O'Connor commented:
"We had to do it. It was critical. Otherwise we wouldn't go out of
business, we would die slowly and that is worse than going out of
business."
After the transition, some commented: "We still don't even know what some of the
question are."
Was The Change Right or Enough?
Although everyone agreed that the change was far reaching, some voiced concern over
whether the change taken by the company was in fact substantial enough or even in the
right direction. One observer indicated:
"Fear of not making the right cuts. That we have not cut deep enough.
That we are going to have to do things again. Everything I read about
people doing these things is that we have not gone far enough."
Another commented, "I worry that Copley is not doing a flavor of the month club.
Reengineering and change has been trendy lately."
All agreed on the surprising level of physical and mental demands involved in the change
process. The process was found to be both intellectually exhausting and physically
tasking. One participant lamented, "The process is highly time consuming, longer, harder
and deeper than anyone originally thought." Several others observed, "I never want to go
through this again."
O'Connor's Personal Evolution
Some saw a relationship between the creation of Copley by O'Connor and the recreation
of Copley by O'Connor through the change process: "I think the decision to create this
company and his decision to initiate the change was something very unique and personal
to him. He came forward in a very dramatic way with ideas then and now."
Many felt O'Connor's personal evolution was one of the most critical steps in the change
process:
"Joe needed to change himself before he could tell other people to change.
This process of change would not have been successful unless Joe sat
down with himself and said 'You know, I probably have to change, too.'"
Another felt O'Connor's personal reassessment was the result of his love for the company
he built from scratch and his concern for the company's future existence:
"If Joe did not care so much for the company, I don't think we would have
ever gone through the restructuring. Who knows were Copley Real Estate
Advisors would be?"
Values
O'Connor believed the people of the new Copley will not have "somewhat different
values." The old individualistic deal maker mentality which successfully propelled
Copley through the 1980's will be downplayed in the future. Instead, Copley's success
will be achieved through a team effort in which skills are contributed from a variety of
team members. As one person observed, "The key to this change is realizing that the
whole is greater than sum of the parts and the company must utilize its various skills
together."
Communication
During the change process, effective communication to all members of the company was
essential to avoid misinformation and confusion. Although the implementation of the
change process was widely viewed as excellent, some felt the communication of the
changes and the resulting impact on the employees was not handled well during the
transition period. As one senior manager observed: "I would say we got an A on
implementation. On communication issues, I'd say we got a B- to C."
Transition Period
Many felt the transition period was too lengthy and exposed employees to prolonged
uncertainty. As one observed, the transition was "dragging on too long with no dates
certain." Another commented, "The transition process has been a little cloudy, a little
difficult on people and its sort of been drawn out."
Specifically, the two weeks of the "Hands-Up" process was widely viewed as the most
stressful period of the transition. There was wide spread concern during this period over
the number of layoffs. As a junior manager indicated: "One day you think your job was
safe and then rumors would spread and say 'Oh my God, there's going to be fifty people
that are going to be laid off.' So there was a lot of uncertainty."
"Hands-Up"
Although there were complaints of the length of transition and the length of the "Hands-
Up" process, the "Hands-Up" process itself energized people and gave them a feeling of
control. Once the assignments were announced, people felt the concept of the "Hands-
Up" process was good: "What it allowed people was to do something different if they
really wanted to. That was what was good about the process." Furthermore, people were
very "realistic in the "Hands-Up approach"' and in their selection of positions. Another
expressed satisfaction by saying "Everybody was really, really happy with what a good
job Human Resources did in placing people in the jobs."
Buy-In
As one senior manager reflected: "Buy-in to this whole process is incredibly important."
Buy-in was defined as the active support and participation in the change process by all
members of the company.
Size Factor
Copley's size facilitated the change process: "Copley had a big plus in the change process
in that they are relatively small compared to a company like AT&T. Changes can be
implemented more quickly and thoroughly."
Reactionary
Although a majority of the people believed the changes were correct and not too radical, a
small minority reacted negatively to the prospect of change in the company. Some
thought the changes were too extensive without testing in a controlled or smaller
environment. As one senior manager commented: "We don't understand what some of
the risks are. The risks don't have anything to do with structure, but with people." Some
reactionary emotions ran high: "People would come into my office and literally
scream...about how we are destroying this company." These people believed that either
the changes were too radical or that the changes were unneeded and that the company
should have "ridden out the current down cycle." Positioning these reactions on a bell-
shaped curve, the reaction of "No need for change" and "Change was too radical" were
outliers representing a small minority. Those believing the "Changes were correct" were
in the center of the bell-shaped curve and represented the majority.
Continual Innovation
Many believed in "maintaining a constant commitment to the change process." However,
some voiced concern of the human weakness of attributing all problems to change as
opposed to searching for corrective processes or creative solutions. The challenge was to
continually seek solutions to problems as opposed to condemning the change as
unworkable and retreat to an old process. One observer commented:
"Human reaction during any change or difficulty is to cling to that which
you are most comfortable with. That is the history people have. I think the
weakness or difficulty will be to continually evaluate how we are doing
and pushing people to go beyond the old way of doing things... A
weakness would be a human predisposition to the familiar way. You need
to constantly check in to make sure you are not."
CHALLENGES AHEAD:
The people at Copley were excited about the changes and looked forward to the future.
However, the road ahead was anticipated to be more tasking, more tiring than the one
traveled. Copley faced major challenges:
"Copley has to maintain its top five position. It has to learn how to market
and sell its investments. It has to have a story. What makes Copley
different?"
New Revenue
The future of the company was based on its ability to find and generate new sources of
revenue. Revenue growth was expected to come primarily from the New Business block.
Without new sources of revenue, the existing revenue base would continue to decline
causing inevitable layoffs, merger or closing. This challenge was expressed by a senior
manager: "We need to get back into New Business. We need to be back as productive
members of the real estate investment environment." More bluntly, another person
observed: "New Business has to succeed. If it does not succeed, we are all in a little bit of
trouble." New revenue was anticipated from a number of areas:
"Our client is much broader than pension funds. In going through the
whole process, we set up a series of strategic initiatives in areas - We need
to form an alliance with a mutual fund. We need to be in the 401(k)
business... We need to be in the securitized business. We need to be much
more actively involved."
Whatever form new business was to take, the key was accessing capital: "Capital raising
is a primary concern.." By gaining control of new investment capital, new revenue to
Copley was realized from capital management fees. A significant challenge for the New
Business initiative in the raising of investment capital was to:
"get our story developed and our strategy such that investors can
understand who we are and what we are. To some extent, Copley is
hindered by the stereotype that we were a developmental niche player and
a company of the 1980's."
Developing new products to suit the investor's needs and desires was critical:
"We as a company have to be very flexible in designing product...
Previously, we had one product... The advisors were pompous to the
pension funds over the last ten years. They told the pension funds 'You
don't know what you need. We know what you need.'...Now the pension
funds are saying 'We know what we need, but you do not provide the
product that we need'....This is a product issue."
Existing Business
While searching for new sources of revenue, the existing client relationships had to be
maintained and serviced to the client's satisfaction. With teams servicing their respective
portfolios, the Blockheads, Stakeholders and Experts provided the company wide
perspective and "filled in the cracks between the teams."
Many of the clients were used to interacting with certain Copley employees. With the
reassignments in personnel and responsibilities, the clients often had new points of
contact. This realignment could have caused some confusion and misunderstanding with
the client and even within Copley. As one individual commented, the challenge lay with
"the difficulty in addressing existing relationships when the new teams and new jobs have
been established." One concern was "whether the clients/investors have the same point
of contact with the new Copley." This concern was addressed by the involvement of the
Experts.
People
The new organization challenged people to adapt and develop new skills to successfully
operate within the new company vision and team environment. Some people were unable
or unwilling to change. A senior manager observed, "A lot of people will have to develop
the skills to manage in this new environment."
There was the expectation some people may fall short. In this regard, another commented:
"Some people will not be able to make the transition or the skill change." For those that
cannot adapt, the future was uncertain. A senior manager commented, "I fully expect
some of the team leaders will need to be replaced." Another expressed: "Nothing
personal, but some will be let go if they cannot keep up."
However, there was a fine line between replacing people out of frustration, as problems
develop, and replacing people inadequate for the position. The trick for the senior
management was to distinguish between the two.
Knowledge Transfer
Concerns were raised on the means of efficiently transferring experience and knowledge
from an individual(s) to the newly organized team. Much of the individual's experience
and knowledge was garnered over the years. In the new structure, the individual with a
particular knowledge of an issue may not have been assigned to the team responsible for
that issue in the future. Although many viewed the team format and empowerment as the
best way to serve the client, the challenge was to effectively transfer experience and
knowledge from one part of Copley to another. If the transfer was not made, the client,
instead of being serviced, was disservice. A senior manager expressed this concern:
"I think the client service aspect will work and we will be more responsive
to the client's needs because the decision making will be within the team
or portfolio, where it needs to be...My biggest fear is that the people
running the portfolio have no real estate experience for the most part. We
have empowered them and they like it, but I hope they don't take this
empowerment and go crazy with it because if they don't start checking
with people who have all the experience and knowledge and the history,
then they will be making bad decisions. We haven't seen that yet, but there
are indications that people say there is no reason to talk to a higher up
because it is my deal now. The higher ups are here as a resource and
should be utilized. That is my biggest fear."
Shift From Function To Process
The shift from function orientation to process orientation was demanding. The challenge
for Copley was to continue the change process and not stop halfway or retrench when
people had difficulty assimilating in the new environment. One person expressed a
common fear:
"I don't know how it is going to work. Being process oriented as opposed
to task oriented is really a behavioral change and its difficult to change
your behavior. I feel that it is difficult and I think people are going to have
a hard time with it."
Another observed: "Functioning as teams does not come easily to people. It is something
we have to learn. You have to work at it."
Team Objectives vs. Company Objectives
Although the company had an overall objective, the team's success was measured by the
team's performance in relationship to the team goals. Theoretically, the company's and
the team's goals matched. In practice, however, the actions of a team striving to achieve
their goals may have adversely impacted another component of the company. The
challenge was to allow the teams to operate independently, but with a view of the
ramifications to the company as a whole. The issue, related to giving the teams decision
making power, was the balancing of that control and independence with overall company
objectives. One senior executive noted:
"My biggest fear is you're going to have a bunch team leaders who now
think they're presidents of small companies. I think to meet your team
objectives is admirable, but people can't forget that we are still one
company which has corporate goals and that your teams and goals and
visions have to be aligned with corporate goals and you have to operate as
one company."
Diffusion Of Power
With empowerment, the role of senior management changed from decision maker to
director. The challenge was for senior management to release control and allow the teams
to make the decisions. Senior management had to become comfortable in their new roles.
The value a senior manager provided to the new organization was be very different from
their value in the old organization. A senior manager said:
"I used to make decisions. Now I facilitate. I am a facilitator. People are
now empowered. They used to ask my advice. It's tough because for 20
years people ask your advice. You've got a title that sounds pretty good
and people seek your counsel and now that doesn't happen anymore. No
one seeks your counsel. They are coming in and telling you what they did.
My role is entirely different."
Many viewed this as a particularly difficult and challenging for everyone, including
O'Connor, at Copley. One senior manager commented: "I think it is going to be
interesting if Joe can keep his hands out of the funds and just kind of be there as the
advice giver." If the senior management was not able to control their involvement in team
affairs, the threat was clearly a backslide into the old format.
This fear was expressed by a senior manager in the following statement:
"I am afraid that it is not going to work, that we will sort of fall back into
our bad habits again. I am afraid that people won't be empowered to make
decisions and that people will still be task oriented."
A junior manager expressed the same concern,
"A lot of the talk you hear going on is that people are empowered to make
decisions now and I still don't see it. We still have to go through two
people to get some equipment approved. So I don't know how much that is
really true."
Standardization
The teams were empowered to operate independently. However, the challenge facing the
teams and the blockheads was to standardize, without stifling creativity or reducing
empowerment, certain procedures across the teams. The standardization avoided
repetition of effort and provided consistent reporting and presentation to the outside
world. Areas of standardization range from authority to enter into contracts to reporting
on properties and markets to investors and the public. One observer commented on the
issue of "getting all the procedures and controls in place. When moving from a
centralized to a decentralized format, control becomes a big concern. Who is authorized
to bind the company to a contract?" Another commented on the concern of "inefficiencies
in processes that really should be standardized across the company or within a block --i.e.
valuation. Properties in Southern California should be valued the same way, have the
same outlook and a the story that is exactly the same."
Management Of Data
Redundancy of information, knowledge and process among the teams was a concern for
many people. With each team operating as an individual entity, redundancy was a threat
among teams with overlapping areas of responsibility. One senior manager expressed this
concern in the following:
"It is a little cloudy for us how we are going to organize ourselves, so that
there is not redundancy or that there are not things lost in the
communication between teams."
With the teams aligned around portfolios as opposed to the previous alignment of
development partners, there was bound to be redundancy in expertise. As one manager
observed:
"Now you have a redundancy in expertise. Three people who know the
Southern California market instead of one." [This may have created
synergy,] "but in reality, it really means three people know the same bit of
information."
One way to minimize redundancy was "to make sure every one talks to each other."
Others hope the redundancy in information collection would be overcome largely by the
Information & Research group. This block was hoped to provide systems to control and
manipulate the wealth of the company's data base and provide external data as well.
Although the company planned an extensive automation program through Information
and Research, Copley had a wealth of data on properties and markets that remained
untapped in the absence of an appropriate system. For instance, the company was unable
to determine something as elemental as the occupancy levels among all their office
projects. The challenge was to install a system to efficiently access this and other types of
data for internal and external presentation. Right now, however, these steps were just
being conceptualized and the void was clearly evident. One senior manager complained,
"Lets deal with the basic problem first. I need information about my own company. I need
access to a data base. Right now, I don't have that."
This was a tremendous challenge for Copley. Although everyone saw Information and
Research as being a linchpin to Copley's future success, there remained many "ifs." One
observer commented, "Research is not adequately supported yet. But you have to walk
before you can run. We are never going to be a research driven firm, but a research
guided firm."
Employee Compensation
With many of the deal driven personalities still in the firm, the effort was to shift the
"deal junkies psychic rewards from doing deals" to being psychologically rewarded by the
success of the team and the company. O'Connor commented, "What I want to see is the
team do well. When we formed Copley 12 years ago, it really was a small team. If
anybody did something that was good and it benefited the company as a whole,
everybody felt good about it. That's what the feeling should be..."
A major challenge was establishing the new reward system in the new Copley: "There are
issues of rewards. How do you reward a team for doing a great job or going about their
goals? And that's always been an issue - the compensation here."
The reward system needed to address compensation, promotion, and titles. One manager
commented on these issues:
"We are still struggling with compensation and reward issues. As a result,
these answers are still being formed."
Making It Work
Success in meeting the challenges can be measured in a variety of ways. However,
Phillips offered two practical measures:
"I think the change process will be viewed as successful, if we can find
some ways to get back in business and have some successes. The
second...is if the teams can look back and say , 'I really am running my
own company. I really do have authority to act.' "
One of the founding members offered the following sobering thought:
"If this whole change process doesn't work, it will be tough to unwind
because the whole decision making process is being changed now. If we
were to abandon the new structure and go back to the old structure or some
variation, people would really be confused. Plus the people outside
Copley, investors and bankers, would perceive Copley as being in a state
of turmoil. We have to make this work. We do not have the luxury of
going back."
FINAL COMMENTS
A major question was where the change would lead. O'Connor reflected: "I'll be honest,
when I started this off I had no idea how far it would go." The old organization had
certain codes of operations and internal relationships that had evolved over time. As the
extent of the change became clear, some people quickly realized the inability to transfer
these rules and relationships to the new organization. As issues arose, the new
organization had to develop a new set of rules and internal relationships. This observation
was reflected by one manager:
"A weakness is that people know an old process or system of doing things
for good or bad and that at least gave them very defined ground rules.
There are not a lot of ground rules in some of these things. There are fewer
ground rules then there needs to be. We are in the process of identifying
some of those."
However, some felt many of these ground rules would develop over time as problems
arose:
"We'll go through the change now. Everybody will be reallocated and then
we will find out what works and what doesn't work. Some things are not
going to work, but we won't know that until we are actually up and
operating and that will probably happen within six months or a year. That
has to be the one weakness, it is not actually in place. So you don't really
know what is going to work."
Although a large step, the restructuring was only the first in the change process. That the
change process was continuous came as a revelation to some involved. O'Connor
commented,
"We are in the process. We will never finish the process....We are in the
middle of it right now, but its something that's not sort of going from one
set of concrete shoes to another set of concrete shoes. We're trying to
basically set up a process where we're constantly reinventing, constantly
reengineering, constantly changing the company."
As changes needed to be made, Copley will be in a position "to do the evolution and not
the revolution."
CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS
In this chapter, the case study (Chapter Three) is compared to the reengineering matrix
presented at the end of the literature review (Chapter Two). The analysis will divide the
complete matrix into more easily understandable sections which will be compared to the
case. After the sectional analyses, the complete matrix will be presented. The purpose of
the matrix is to serve as a guideline for defining and implementing the reengineering
process. Although it contains elements that are commonly found in reengineering, it is by
no means the definitive table for every reengineering process.
As indicated by the matrix, many of the results or outcomes of the reengineering process
in the case are too early to be determined. The analysis will focus on the definition and
implementation of BPR in the case.
Figure 3: Forces for Change
Characteristics/Definitions AsApplicable to Case
Present Not Present w/ Brief Explanation
Present Qualifier
Forces for Change
.............................................. .................................................... 
................................... .  . .
Change in Market Market declined
Conditions
Customer Demands Higher demands
Increasing Competition Not a factor
Continuous Change Cyclical market mandates adaptability
Form Follows Strategy Design around goals and processes
Internal Demand Employee frustration with old
_______________________ 
organization.
Change in Market Condition
The dramatic shift in the national real estate market in the late 1980's and early 1990's
provided a colossal force for change for many real estate related companies including
Copley. The value of the properties held in Copley's portfolios dropped sharply along
with the decrease in cash flow received from the rents for these properties.
Customer Demands
With the subsequent decline in real estate returns, came a sharp slide in client satisfaction.
The change in Copley, was largely if not entirely client and market driven. These items in
the matrix clearly apply to the case.
Internal Demand was not a part of the matrix at the end of Chapter Two, this is something that specifically
applied to the Copley case.
Increasing Competition
Although increasing competition is often a force for change in reengineering, in the case
the force was more of a function of market decline rather than competition. In fact,
competition for joint venture partnerships, Copley's previous bread and butter, had all but
disappeared in the late 1980's.
Continuous Change
The business environment is constantly changing, a company's organizational strategy
should be able to adapt accordingly. Although it is still early to see further examples of
continuos change in the case, there has been a recognition by Copley that change is an
ongoing process. Most of the people interviewed, indicated that change was going to be a
long term process and viewed reengineering not as a final change but more as the first
step of an ongoing process.
Form Follows Strategy
One important aspect of reengineering is that the structure of an organization should
follow its strategy. In the case, the clients demanded more responsive, accurate reporting
as the market soured. Also, new areas of business were required in order for Copley to
continue to grow. Copley restructure itself so that it operated more efficiently for
increased responsiveness to its clients. The new structure had to enable Copley to
aggressively pursue new business opportunities as they arose. The result was a
restructuring that was driven and designed by a strategic focus.
Internal Demand
Although it is not an item of the original matrix, internal demand it was clearly a force for
change in the case. Before reengineering , many employees were frustrated with the
inefficiencies of Copley's organizational system. One employee pointed out that prior to
the change, "everything had to be run by Joe [O'Connor]; it was extremely inefficient".
There was an internal drive in Copley to modify some of the inefficient business
processes.
Figure 4: Candidates for Reengi ng
........................................................................... ....................ler n.................................
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
Qualifier
Candidates for reengineering
Companies in deep trouble Still managed a significant amount,but were heading for trouble if not
........ ........ ... .... ........ ..... .... ............. .. .......................... 
*... . . . . . .... . . . . .......... .........
Trouble up ahead Clearly in case
Companies that want to Not the case
continuepeak performance _
The case mirrored many of the implementation components that are outlined in the
matrix. Copley fit the description of a common candidate for reengineering. It was a
company that saw the trouble ahead if it were to operate in a "business as usual" fashion.
When the case study was done, the company still managed roughly $10 billion in assets
and would not be considered to be in trouble by many. However, this was considerably
lower than its one-time peak of $15 billion. The flow of new investor money was
becoming a trickle, and current investors were becoming dissatisfied with Copley's
performance.
Figure 5: Definitions
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
...........................................................................................    
Q u ifie................... 
Definitions
Radical redesign of business .Focused on processes in the redesign
along processes _of the structure.
Fundamental Fundamental questions were asked
in the redesign.
Customer oriented New design focused on customer
satisfaction
Tremendous potential Too early to tell; not yet known
breakthroughs in performance
Radical Redesign of Business Along Processes
It is apparent that many of the descriptions and characteristics of reengineering apply to
the Copley case. The company was previously very function-oriented. It concentrated on
the individual tasks involved in a process instead of the process itself. Through BPR,
each process at Copley was analyzed diagramatically in order to discover inefficiencies.
The company evolved from being function-oriented to being process-oriented.
The case involved radical change in that there was not an attempt to simply modify one
aspect of the organization or put a "Band Aid" on a dysfunctional part. Rather, there was
a focus on reinventing the strategy and processes of the entire organization.
Fundamental
Since the basic organizational structure of Copley was altered, there was fundamental
change in the case. Fundamental questions, such as "What do we do?" and "Why do we
do it that way?" were asked when analyzing the old roles and processes of the
organization.
Customer Oriented
Since the need for change was largely client driven, the reengineering process at Copley
was customer oriented. There was a focus on increasing the responsiveness to the
customer and a concern for increasing customer satisfaction.
Tremendous Potential Performance Breakthroughs
Although it is still too early to see most of the breakthroughs in performance from
reengineering, the potential for increased efficiency through streamlined business
processes is present in the case.
Figurei6:. The Players
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
Qualifier
The Players
Leader 4O'Connor initiated the change
process, gained support of others.
Process Owner Previously, no process owners;
"Block heads" became process
owners.
Reengineering Team 4Various teams served this function.
Steering Committee Delta was the governing body for
change, but may have disbanded too
................ . .......... . ........... 
.... soon.
Reengineering Czar Consultants performed this function
as experts and facilitators.
For the most part, the key players of reengineering, identified by Hammer and Champy,
were present in the case study:
Leader
Joe O'Connor played the role of the leader of the reengineering process in the case. He
was the senior executive who authorized the change process, gained the support of
management and employees, and motivated the overall effort.
Process Owners
Since the old Copley structure was function-oriented, not process-oriented, there were no
process owners to help redesign the processes. The responsibility to redesign the
processes was given to Delta, OAT, and Strategy. These teams were comprised of senior
management who were familiar with how the various functions interacted within Copley.
They and created new processes.
Reengineering Team
These are the various teams including Delta, OAT, Strategy, Gridlock, and Transition
involved in the change process. This was comprehensive process and required a
considerable time commitment by the reengineering team members; the responsibility of
the process was divided by the teams, each with specific goals.
Steering Committee
Delta was the "Steering Committee". It was the policy making body which created the
other change teams. Delta was responsible for overseeing and monitoring the progress of
the reengineering effort. One fault might have been that Delta was disbanded before the
transition was completed. Thus, it never oversaw the transition phase of the process, but
relied solely on the transition team to accomplish this task.
Reengineering Czar
The reengineering czars were the consultants who fulfilled an important role in the
reengineering process. Their role was primarily as a facilitator to the various change
activities and not the initiators. The consultant, T.A.B., helped to maintain the focus of
the change process and guide the change teams when they had questions regarding their
roles. They helped with developing reengineering techniques and tools to guide the
process. As mentioned in the case, Copley first "digested and drew its own conclusions";
the consultants were mainly facilitators and were careful not to bombard Copley with
their own ideas and impressions. This ensured that Copley understood the need for
change and its change strategy since Copley was ultimately responsible for developing
both. Perhaps "facilitators" is a more appropriate descriptor than "czars".
Steps in Implementation
Figure 7: Create a Vision Focusing on Operations
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
Qualifier
Steps in Implementation
Create a Vision Focusing on Vision tied business assumptions
with operations.
Picture of "end state" O'Connor's and Delta's vision of the
new Copley.
Customer requirements O'Connor's list of assumptions and
Delta's input for change.
Features of company's most OAT'scorecompetencyassessment
successful products of -opley
Capabilities with worthwhile P c
and defensible edge assmn
Include measurable objectives Oad enb egI --_ accomplish with a time table
Picture of "End State"
There was a focus on the vision of the new Copley throughout the reengineering process
which was influential in the assessment of changes to be made. O'Connor had a clear
vision of the "end-state" where he wanted the company to be. He communicated this
vision with management and employees before the company began the design and
implementation process. Delta and the Vision and Values Team, worked together in
developing and refining O'Connor's initial vision.
Customer Requirements
As part of identifying the vision and setting a plan to achieve it, O'Connor made list of
basic assumptions that he saw for the business environment in the future (Appendix B).
Subsequently, each role and process in the organization was questioned by OAT as to its
function and relevance keeping the customer requirements in mind. Also, the Strategy
Team developed corporate strategy around customer requirements as defined by the
vision and values statement.
Features of Company's Most Successful Products
Each process at Copley was analyzed by OAT. The team asked some very fundamental
yet important questions: "What were Copley's specialties?", "In what areas did they have
a competitive edge?", "What processes needed improvement?" By doing this, a list of
Copley's core competencies and areas of improvement was formed.
Capabilities with Worthwhile and Defensible Edge
After OAT assessed Copley's core competencies, it determined which capabilities had a
place in the new organization.
Include Measurable Objectives
Both OAT and the Gridlock Team formed specific, measurable change recommendations
for the company. OAT's focus was more on Copley's fundamental structural change.
The Gridlock Team focused on the "quick-fix" changes that could facilitate the larger
change and reduce gridlock in decision making.
Figure 8: Analyze Current Structure
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
...Qu fie.
Analyze Current Structure
and Processes..
Target processes The "what" and "why" of each
process was analyzed.
Organizational issues Company structure was analyzed.
Readiness of systems/leaders This was assessed by Gridlock.
to change
Assessment of capability to A big concern, in order to meet
operate under change demands of clients during process.
Determination of potential Some were anticipated, others were
... oblem.from.c.an.e..............om..dmadiscovered during the process.
IT infrastructure IT needed change but not clear how
to change it exactly.
Target Processes
Only after making a thorough self-assessment of the company and its processes, was
OAT able to make structural change recommendations. OAT targeted each process within
Copley and asked "What is the purpose of this?" and "Why do we do it this way?". The
processes were then mapped to visually look at their efficiency. Through this exercise,
OAT discovered that many of Copley's processes were highly inefficient, often looking
like a "spaghetti bowl" when mapped.
Organizational Issues
OAT discovered through the process mapping that there were some definite weaknesses
in the organizational structure at Copley. Part of the reason, OAT discovered, was due to
the fact that Copley had been function-related rather than process-related. Many times,
each function was compartmentalized without regard for the process as a whole. It lacked
a big picture framework. The reorganization focused on the process as a whole, and each
team was developed in order to perform a certain process. If there was no longer a need
for a specific process, the team would be disbanded.
Readiness for Systems/Leaders to Change
O'Connor realized that having the active support and participation from all levels of the
organization was critical for the change process to be successful. Before the process
began, O'Connor made sure that management and the employees of Copley were behind
the reengineering program. As a result, there was a great deal of readiness and
anticipation for change to be begin. The general consensus, in fact, was to move "full
speed ahead" in order to more quickly accomplish the initial, more difficult change
associated with the restructuring. In hind sight, many did not anticipate the amount of
work involved, or the broad scope of the change process. However, most were satisfied
with the pace at which it was implemented.
Assessment of Potential to Operate Under Change
It was crucial for Copley to be able to run its business and fulfill current client needs
while the change process was being implemented. Although in the long run Copley
anticipated more efficient client communication and service, in the short run it was
anticipated that the blockheads, stakeholders, and experts would have to "fill the cracks"
between the teams during the implementation process.
Potential Problems from Change
Some of the problems from change were identified by Copley before the before the
implementation process was underway. The Gridlock Team, sought to troubleshoot
potential problems and take action to eliminate them. Some of the problems creating
gridlock were lack of prioritization, improper allocation of resources (i.e. some were
overloaded with work), and insufficient internal support.
Other potential barriers to change were identified during the implementation process.
Learning the skills necessary to function in the new organization was one of the biggest
challenges for Copley employees. The tendency to slip back into the old way of doing
things was a concern voiced by many. Other challenges such as efficiently transferring
knowledge and experience within the group, and management's ability to perform as
more of a "coach" than a "player" were cited. Redundancy, where there is an overlapping
of team responsibility was seen as another problem which Copley would try to avoid.
Effective communication among the team members will be necessary in keeping
redundancy to a minimum. Although many problems were identified by Copley so far,
there was an acknowledgment that many more will be identified as the reengineering
process continues.
IT Infrastructure
The existing Management information Systems of the old Copley were analyzed by OAT
and many deficiencies were found. Most of these were inefficiencies in processing and
reporting property data for the portfolios. OAT saw the restructuring of the existing IT
system as important for the success of the new organization. Many saw the restructuring
of IT as giving Copley a competitive advantage. The fact that IT was one of the four
blocks (Information and Research Block), demonstrates the importance placed on it. The
exact function of IT going forward, however, was still unclear. Copley acknowledged
that it did not yet have the person with the background and experience necessary to head
the IT block. Once this person was found, a more comprehensive analysis of the needed
change in IT could be done.
Figyure 9: Redesign Business Structure
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
Qualifier
Redesign business structure
Reorganize processes Team approach implemented after
according to analysis the analysis.
Performed
Are activities cost Yes, in light of long term
effective? efficiencies.
Is individual's reward Benchmarking had not yet been set-
system linked to but would be linked to performance.
.....................
Identify which processes Gridlock prioritized processes and
.. 
items to be changed.
Dysfunction 1 4 Yes, also prioritized by OAT.
Importance 1Yes, prioritized by Gridlock.
Feasibility ISame
Reorganize Process According to Analysis
The processes at Copley were reorganized after a thorough analysis and process mapping
took place. The decision was to create teams that were responsible for the entire process
instead of just one or two tasks in the process.. The team leaders were selected to be
responsible for the various processes. The members of each team were selected after
analyzing each employees skills and core competencies. A careful matching was done on
the basis of individual skills, knowledge, and compatibility in order to create the most
effective combination of team members. The approval process was streamlined
accordingly so that the teams were largely responsible for the day to day decision making
within Copley.
Are Activities Cost Effective?
In the new structure, there will be efficiencies gained from the decrease in bureaucracy
and the elimination of many checks and controls. As a result, the processes will be
streamlined and become more cost effective than before. There will be a savings of both
human and financial capital.
The activities involved in implementing the change process were cost effective. These
costs were largely in the time (human capital) that they took to implement. It is
anticipated that these costs will be recuperated in the companies added efficiency from
the resulting streamlined processes.
Is the reward system linked to peformance?
The rewards system was one of the few areas that Copley had yet to redesign. Copley
realized the importance of linking the reward system to individual and group performance
in order to incentivize the teams and individuals. A performance-based reward system
was anticipated for the new organization, but Copley had not yet developed a detailed
plan for benchmarking (gauging performance) by the time the case was written.
Identify which Processes to Reorganize First
It was the responsibility of OAT and the Gridlock Team to prioritize the reorganization of
each process. After OAT identified and analyzed the dysfunctional processes, the
Gridlock Team ranked the implementation of each new process by the degree of
importance to Copley. Also, the feasibility of implementing each process was assessed.
Gridlock identified those processes which could be applied relatively quickly and those
which would take more time to implement. The "quick fixes" were implemented
immediately, and those that would take a greater deal of time were then prioritized by
importance.
gure 10: Implement Redesigned Organization and Processes
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
| ualifier
Implement Redesigned Undergoing the transition process,
Organization and Processes transition team not as focused as
-.. others.
Measure the benefits and Learning was shared by teams, and
share learning facilitated by transition team,
Sbenefits had not yet been measured
At the time the case study was finished, Copley was still working through the
implementation processes. The "hands up process" in which the employees walked away
from their old jobs and came back to their new team assignments, had just been
completed. The teams were becoming acclimated to working in the new environment.
The Transition Team was formed in order to pursue and implement the new
organizational structure which was formed by OAT. The team was still active when the
case was finished and had not set a date for the official end of the transition phase. As
mentioned in the case, the Transition Team lacked the feedback and guidance from Delta,
since Delta was disbanded by time the transition period began. Some members of the
Transition Team felt that the team was "too tired" and "too immersed" in the change
process. Others, thought that the team lacked the focus and clarity of purpose that the
other teams had. Regardless, the fundamental reorganization of Copley, was
implemented and the teams were in place by the time the case was written.
Measured Benefits and Shared Learning
The main purpose of the restructuring was to find and generate new revenue, and increase
client satisfaction with the performance of the company. If those two goals are met, the
benefits of the reorganization are present and the change process would be worthwhile.
The mechanisms for how Copley was to measure the customer satisfaction had yet to be
determined. The task of measuring net revenue was more concrete and more easily
accomplished, but it was too early to see changes in net revenue by the time the case was
finished.
The teams were expected to share in the learning process both within the teams and with
other teams. Regular transition update meetings were planned in which the teams could
share learning experiences. Again, it was too early to measure, and no metrics had been
determined.
Figure 11: Characteristics and Results of Reor aiation
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
Qualifier
Characteristics and Results of
R eo .rgani atio  .............................................
Tasks are Reunited with Team members responsible for an
Group/Individual Responsible ......... entire process were put together.
Flexibility for Further Change Process owners can make variations
to meet demands
Efficient and Responsive Not yet determined.
Completion of Tasks
Checks and controls reduced Fewer approvals and bureaucratic
sign-offs.
Single point of contact Team leaders communicate with
------------  -c lie n ts.
Tasks are Reunited with Those Responsible
Characteristics of reengineering such as the reuniting of tasks with work groups and
worker empowerment were present. With the team format, the tasks were reunited with
those who performed them within the team. For example, the accountant of a particular
portfolio was no longer in a different department, he/she was part of the team that was
handling that portfolio.
Flexibility for Further Changes
The design of the new structure provides for flexibility and responsiveness to changes in
the market and client demands. Since each "process owner" is able to make decisions
without being second-guessed by senior management, each process is much more
responsive. This allows for flexibility and variation as needed.
Efficient and Responsive Completion of Tasks
Theoretically, the team structure would lead to the efficient completion of tasks. At the
time the case was written, it was to early to determine if tasks were performed more
efficiently and responsively.
Checks and Controls Reduced
Checks and controls, which previously slowed the business processes were reduced in the
new system. With the implementation of the new system, the elaborate approval process
would be eliminated and the team leaders would have approval authority for most
decisions made within a team. The new system appears to be more efficient, but has not
been implemented yet.
Single Point of Contact
The new structure has also provided for clients to have a single point of contact with the
team leaders. Previously, O'Connor was the single point of contact for many of Copley's
clients. Now, this responsibility is more efficiently spread among the team leaders. This
will allow for more responsiveness to clients (O'Connor had to defer most questions to
the portfolio manager's anyway), and allow O'Connor and other senior management
more time to run the organization. Although O'Connor will still be actively involved in
maintaining client relations, the clients will be able to efficiently use the team leaders to
obtain answers for specific portfolio or investment questions.
Figure 12: Characteristics and Results of Empowerment
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
... ... . . .......... ------ ---------- .............. ... .-. . . .. ... _Q a er .. .
Characteristics and Results of
Empowerment
Employee power to make decisions Yes, in team structure
Employee responsibility for Individuals and teams will be
decisions responsible for own performance.
Increased commitment and Present so far in the design and
involvement in organization. implementation of change.
Greater effectiveness- more fully Not yet determined.
utilize brain power and creative
aptitudes ---
Information shared among Not yet determined, new set up
employees cProper knowledge - training . Not yet determined.
Employee Power to Make Decision
One of the fundamental elements of the reengineering process at Copley was the
implementation of employee empowerment. The team structure gave more decision
making power to Copley employees. Before, decisions were passed through a multi-tiered
chain of command, in the new organization, most decisions only needed the approval of
the team leader or could be made by the team members themselves.
Employee Responsibility for Decisions
In the old system, there was a tendency to receive approval from senior management as a
sort of transfer of responsibility. Since decision making power is present at lower levels
in the new organization, the new structure does not allow for this deferral of
responsibility. Employees will be more responsible because they are the ones making the
decisions.
Increased Commitment and Involvement
Since the reengineering process was still in its primary stages, it was still early to see an
increased commitment level by management and employees. Employee participation was
critical in shaping the change process. The employees provided input on which the
change teams based many of the redesign decisions. Employee involvement in the
change process is indicative of future levels of involvement, and the new Copley should
have a definite increase in employee commitment and involvement.
Greater Effectiveness
In the new structure, each team will "own" its process. Employees will be able to make
decisions and take action more quickly. As with employee commitment, it was too early
to see the change in employee effectiveness at the time the case was written, however, in
theory the new structure will promote greater employee effectiveness.
Information Sharing
It is natural for team members to share information freely if they communicate frequently
and have the same goals. Sharing information within teams is critical since some of the
team members will have new clients and portfolios to manage. It will be necessary for
team members to familiarize each other with the new responsibilities.
Sharing information between teams can be accomplished as long the as the teams do not
consider each other competition, but members of the company team. If there is an
adversarial relationship between teams, there may be difficulty in sharing information. IT
will also play a role in the sharing of information as its exact function becomes more
clearly established. This has yet to be seen in the case.
Proper Knowledge and Training
Working in a self-directed team will require additional training and knowledge for many
employees. The company has sponsored events such as "team day" in which the new
team members were introduced worked with consultants in learning the basics of team
dynamics. Other training will likely come from working experience as the employees
learn how to interact in the new corporate structure.
The New Business Group, will require new knowledge and skill sets in order to expand
the scope of Copley's business ventures. Some of these skills can be taught internally
from employees sharing experience and knowledge. Other training and skills may come
from outside experts.
Figure 13: Characteristics and Results of IT
Present Not Present Present w/ Brief Explanation
Qualifier
Characteristics and Results of
IT
Create new ways of working New system not yet in place, but this
----- - is a desired outcome of the new IT.
Enables structural organizationalSame
changes
Better communication skills Same
Greater business understanding Same
Easy information flow across Same
departments
Flexible business networks Same
Often, IT is viewed a key aspect of the reengineering process. Many of the authors in the
literature review have written that without IT, reengineering would not be able to take
place. In the Copley case, however, it could be argued that reengineering was initiated
first without a fully operational IT program. More specifically, the team structure and
new business processes were outlined before there was a clear definition and direction for
the IT program. In fact, by the time the research was done on the case, Copley was still
wrestling with the exact role of IT in its change process. It was suggested that a more
definitive role for IT will come from the specialists that will be hired to develop the IT
block. These will be experts in the field of IT who will more fully understand its
capabilities and potentials and will be substantially aid in defining its applications.
One application that Copley anticipated for IT (as mentioned in the case) was a more
efficient system for tracking and updating portfolios for clients. This will not only create
a structural upgrade within the company, but will also enable employee empowerment by
providing a more efficient information system on which decisions can be based. This,
would be an "information at your fingertips" application of IT, which would increase
employee empowerment by increasing the knowledge base. Other anticipated functions
of the IT system will be to provide useful economic and market forecast information
which will allow Copley employees to bring more "value added" to portfolio
management as well as have the necessary information when researching new business
ventures.
The fact that Copley has chosen to redesign IT after the reengineering process had begun,
indicates that IT may come as a result of BPR. In the Copley case, the reengineering
process is more dependent on process orientation and the implementation of empowered,
self-directed teams, rather than IT. Although IT may later add to the teams'
empowerment and effectiveness in making decisions, the reengineering process at Copley
was focused and enabled mainly by the team structure, not IT.
To put the analysis into perspective, the following is the complete matrix in relation to the
Copley case:
Figure 14: Compete Matrix
Characteristics/Definitions As Aplicable t Cple Case
Present Not Present Present wI Brief Explanation
Qualifier
Forces for Change
Change in Market Conditions Market declined
Customer Demands Higher demands
Increasing Competition Not a factor
Continuous Change Cyclical market mandates
___ adaptability
Form Follows Strategy Design around goals and processes
Candidates for reengineering
Companies in deep trouble Still managed a significant amount,but were heading for trouble if not
....................................... .... ......
Trouble up ahead Clearly in case
Companies that want to Not the case
continue peak performance
Definitions
Radical redesign of business
..alon~g pocessesoftesrcu.
Fundamental 4 Fundamental questions were asked
__________________in the redesign.
Customer oriented New design focused on customer
--------- ---------------------------... . . .. ........... .... .... ........... ........ . . satisfaction............. .... . .. ..  .
Tremendous potential Too early to tell; not yet known
breakthroughs in performance
The Players______ _____
Leader O'Connor initiated the change
...... . .
te s e...................................
Process Owner I Previously, no process owners;
"Block heads" became process
Ne---- --- wesig oue ncsoe
Reengineering Team 4Various teams served this function.
Steering Committee......................Delta was the governing body for
change, but may have disbanded too
___________________________ I _____ ____________soon.
Reengineering Czar Consultants performed this function
cas exps and facilitators.
Steps in Implementation"okese
Create a Vision Focusing on Vision tied business assumptions
with operations.
Pict'u re -of"e nds st a te" O'Connor's and Delta's vision of the
_________________________ _____ __________new Copley.
Customer requirements O'Connor's list of assumptions and
Steering____Committee __ __Delta's input for change.
Features of company's most 4OAT's core competency assessment
successful products ofCosultante rfo
Capabilities with worthwhile Part of core competencies
and defensible edge assessment
Include measurable objectives OAT Gridlock, and Transition
Picture ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -of"ed-tte-OCnnr'-ndDet'sviin-f-h
Teams had specific objectives to
accomplish with a time table
Analyze Current Structure
and Processes
Target processes The "what" and "why" of each
process was analyzed.
Organizational issues Company structure was analyzed.
Readiness of systems/leaders This was assessed by Gridlock.
to change
Assessment of capability to A big concern, in order to meet
operate under change demands of clients during process.
Determination of potential Some were anticipated, others were
problems from change discovered during the process.
IT infrastructure 4IT needed change but not clear how
1 to change it exactly.
Redesign business structure
Reorganize processes Team approach implemented after
according to analysis the analysis.
............. perf rned
Are activities cost Yes, in light of long term
effective - efficiencies.
human/financial capital?
Is individual's reward Benchmarking had not yet been set-
system linked to but would be linked to performance.
performance?
Identify which processes Gridlock prioritized processes and
to reorganize first by: .items to be changed.
Dysfunction Yes, also prioritized by OAT.
Importance Yes, prioritized by Gridlock.
Feasibility Same
Implement Redesigned 4Undergoing the transition process,
transition team not as focused as
others.
................................... other............
Measure the benefits and Learning was shared by teams, and
share learning shar leaningfacilitated by transition team.
benefits had not yet been measured
Characteristics and Results of
Reorganization
Tasks are Reunited with Team members responsible for an
Grou/Indvidul Reponsbleentire process were put together.
Flexibility for Further Change Process owners can make variations
to meet demands
Efficient and Responsive Not yet determined.
Completion of Tasks
Checks and controls reduced Fewer approvals and bureaucratic
Single point of contact Team leaders communicate with
clients.
Characteristics and Results of
Employee power to make decisions Yes, in team structure
Employee responsibility for Individuals and teams will be
decisions responsible for own performance.
Increased commitment and Present so far in the design and
involvement in organization. implementation of change.
Greater effectiveness- more fully Not yet determined.
utilize brain power and creative
.aptitudes
.......... .......- . - . . . -...-. ,.--..---
Information shared among Not yet determined, new set up
employees conducive to information sharing.
Proper knowledge - training 4 Not yet determined.
Characteristics and Results of
IT
Create new ways of working New system not yet in place, but this
is a desired outcome of the new IT.
Enables structural organizational Same
changes
Better communication skills Same
Greater business understanding Same
Easy information flow across Same
departments
Flexible business networks Same
Summary
The case study followed the individual items of the matrix closely, especially the
Definitions and Characteristics section of the matrix. The change process at Copley had
most of the characteristics of reengineering as identified in the literature review. There
were, however, some notable exceptions. One was that Copley strayed from the
traditional use of IT as an enabler in the reengineering process. By time the transition
process was nearly over, there was still not a clear picture of the new function of IT.
Copley, however, did make provisions for creating a new system of IT. Since many saw
IT as a feature that would give the company a competitive edge, IT was one of the four
"blocks" of the new organization. The expert or experts that would run the IT block had
not yet been found.
The rewards system was another component that had yet to be concretely defined. Copley
planned to link rewards to performance but needed a clearer picture of how to benchmark
performance in certain groups. Not all of the benchmarking could be done based on
revenue generated. Some departments such as IT and new business were expected to be
cost centers for indefinite period. As a result, the exact method of measuring
performance had not yet been established.
Other aspects of case study were fairly consistent with those identified in the matrix.
Employee empowerment was created by forming decision making teams that were
responsible for entire processes. There was a careful analysis performed on each of the
processes to be redesigned. Copley assessed its core competencies and current skills sets
and tried to match those with the new structure. The implementation of the new
structures was prioritized, and changes that could be made quickly which would facilitate
the implementation of forthcoming processes were identified.
The following chapter will highlight some of the main points of the thesis. These are
points from the literature review, case study, and analysis which have particular
importance to BPR.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Thus far, theoretical and practical aspects of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) have
been presented. The following are some conclusions from the literature review, case
study, and analysis. Some conclusions are specific to the thesis, others have general
applications to BPR.
Move from Function to Process Orientation
One of the critical changes from BPR in the case was the movement away from the
Copley's previous function orientation. Copley's four organization blocks: New
Business, Investment Management, Information & Research, and Corporate Management
are the core processes within the organization. Each block is comprised of team members
which together are capable of performing an entire process. They are able to "cut
through" what were the functions of the old Copley such as accounting, marketing, and
approval. Compiling the previous functions into one working group, the Blocks form
entire processes. The following diagram visually expresses the idea:
Figure 15: Process-Oriented Structure:
COMPLETE PROCESSES
T T
A JUNTINi
EMGETING
CISION K IN G/A O VA L
A D TvI ST R A T
EARCH
SALES X.i MARK NG
T
New Businessj
T
Investment]
Management
Information Corporate
& Research Management
BLOCKS OF THE NEW COPLEY
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Although each block may not use every function from above , the blocks use the
functions necessary to complete the processes.
Information Technology in BPR
The Copley case followed the basic sequence of BPR as outlined in Chapter Two. It first
had a need or force for change, Copley then designed and implemented BPR. Only after
it began the implementation of BPR, could it focus on achieving the benefits of BPR.
The function of IT in the case illustrates this point. When the case was written, a clear
role of IT had yet to be defined. Copley had assessed, analyzed, and redefined its core
business processes. It then created a team oriented structure around the new core
processes. The teams then needed to work through the logistics of each new process.
This needed to be accomplished before the needs of the new IT system could be
identified. For Copley, it was impossible to redesign the IT system before the core
business processes were redesigned by BPR. The core processes had to be developed
first, before Copley could determine how IT would support and enhance these processes.
The role of IT in the Copley case differs from Hammer and Champy's theory of IT in
BPR. Hammer and Champy identify IT as an aspect of reengineering which enables the
reengineering process to occur. In the case, Copley began BPR before the new IT system
was in place. This was done out of necessity; Copley needed to reengineer first in order
to identify the needs of IT.
The difference between the case and Hammer and Champy's theory, presents a "which
comes first, the chicken or the egg" dispute. Hammer and Champy view IT as having to
occur first before BPR is complete. The case presents BPR as the primary mover. It is
the "chicken" which lays the IT "egg". This occurs only after the "chicken" (BPR) has
developed and matured enough to produce the "egg" (IT).
Empowerment and BPR
Similarly, "empowerment" in the case study differs from thoughts in the literature review.
The literature review stated that empowerment, like IT, is an "enabler" of BPR. Again,
the case has shown is that BPR is necessary to redesign the new structure and processes.
Empowerment is the goal as Copley works through the details of how to interact and the
operational mechanics of the new structure.
Vision Leads BPR
A clearly defined vision is critical for the success of BPR. The vision must be clear and
well communicated throughout the organization. A clearly communicated vision of the
new organization provides direction for the change process. Diagnosis and self-analysis
are ineffectual unless there is vision to provide direction. Without vision, BPR would be
an aimless mission destined to fail. It would be characterized by confusion and the
results would not be sustainable.
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Long-term Process
BPR is not just a reshuffling of the pieces of an organization. BPR is a comprehensive
change that that involves careful self-assessment and analysis. BPR fundamentally
changes how employees interact and function within the organization. This type of
change requires a long term commitment from both management and employees.
When the case study was finished, Copley was in a position in which the logistics and
details of the organizational change needed to be worked through. Management teams
such as Delta, OAT, and Gridlock were essential in the early steps of BPR. They helped
formulate the team structure and developed the new processes. The specifics of how the
employees, teams, and blocks interact with each other then had to be established.
Unfortunately, management cannot wave the "magic wand" of reengineering and bypass
the hard work involved in figuring out the details. This will take time and continuous
effort on the part of both management and employees. In fact, many companies realizing
the long term nature of BPR, budget three to seven years for its implementation.
The thesis has shown that BPR is a fundamental, organizational change where a move
from function-orientation to process-orientation is necessary. Before BPR can be
successfully implemented, there must be a vision of what the organization will be after
the reengineering process. Vision must be primary before any analysis or process
redesign can occur. With empowerment as a goal, BPR is more likely to produce
heightened results. Information Technology is often an important part of BPR, but is not
the driver. BPR takes time and hard work for the whole organization. BPR is a long term
process; it is an ongoing process that should be continually appraised and renewed. If
not, results from BPR will only be short-lived. A quote from Winston Churchill aptly
sums this view:
LffuL. ur on Lord M d 19.
.....Winston Churchill on Lord Mayor's day, 1942.
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APPENDIX B
O'Connor's Fourteen Assumptions About the Environment
1. Investors are customers and developer partners are suppliers.
2. Investors will demand more attention, servicing, control and autonomy.
3. Change is accelerating, while our ability to change is decelerating.
4. Decision-making must be faster to accomplish goals and produce desired results.
5. Sourcing may be in large part developer oriented, but cannot be developer driven or
developer dependent.
6. Clients need to see a dramatic change in approach to determine if Copley is ready to
serve them through the 1990's.
7. Our core and non-core partners are changing. They are growing older, less wealthy,
less entrepreneurial and less willing to take risks. Many of the larger partners have
redefined their role from development and entrepreneurial organizations to that of
management/service organizations.
8. Development will play much less of a role in real estate financing throughout the
1990's.
9. The need for a diversified asset/portfolio management service by large investors,
whether they be corporations or pension funds, will continue and will probably
accelerate in the future.
10. Securitization is rapidly changing and here to stay.
11. We still have a lot of good will in the investors' industry.
12. Copley has a set of unique people, skills and relationships that give us a strong
competitive edge in a narrow segment of the market.
13. Properties are becoming more fungible, more commodity like.
14. Real estate sources of funds will continue to diversify.
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APPENDIX C
Copley Real Estate Advisors Mission Statement
Copley is an industry-leading, customer-driven real estate investment services company
which provides innovative, differentiated products and services to meet the changing
goals of its customer.
Copley Real Estate Advisors Value Statements
e Customer Driven: "Its the Customer, Stupid."
e Innovative: "Adapt like a pioneer."
e Execute with Urgent Determination: "What are you waitingfor."
e Reward Courage and Achievement: "Dare to be exceptional."
e Passion for Excellence: "Think, plan communicate, do it, learn, and reinvent."
e Seek Strength from Diversity: "Value new ideas, different people and approaches."
e Act with Integrity always: "No spin. "
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APPENDIX D
New Copley Organizational Structure- Effective April 1994
Organizational Structure
Visionary (and Recommended)
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Senior Management Team
Members: ResponslbitNles:
CEO -Leader Srategy
Process Owners (3) New Prod Auth
OtAside Advisory Reinvention
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